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This thesis assesses the viability of applying dissuasion towards the development 
of offensive counter space (OCS) systems by China.  As a relatively new defense policy 
and certainly one that has never been explicitly applied previously, this thesis delves into 
the characteristics prescribed by recent U.S. planning documents to develop a strategy 
that more appropriately addresses the current security concerns.  Implicitly, dissuasion is 
intended to prevent future arms races with China through well-placed U.S. actions that 
channel adversary efforts in a direction desired by Washington.   
Several things become clear during this investigation.  First, very little scholarly 
work exists discussing the concept of dissuasion and the mechanisms used to formulate, 
implement, and execute it as a defense policy.  Second, that while an admirable attempt 
to lessen the need for more costly policy options such as deterrence and defeat, 
dissuasion will not prevent China from developing counter space weapons, especially 
since ground-based jammers that target satellite links have already proven effective.  
Third, the best chance of dissuading China’s efforts to acquire space-based OCS systems 
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Recently, several key U.S. planning documents have explicitly spelled out a 
defense strategy that “actively” pursues American security.  While the traditional 
challenges of previous eras are not entirely gone, other challenges have sprouted that 
threaten U.S. interests.  New strategies are necessary to counter these new challenges.  In 
addition, new strategies incorporate lessons learned from the failures of past policies.  
The 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) advocates one such new strategy. 
We will work to dissuade potential adversaries from adopting threatening 
capabilities, methods, and ambitions, particularly by developing our own 
key military advantages.1 
Furthermore, current U.S. leadership has explicitly identified one particular area of 
concern. 
In particular, Asia is gradually emerging as a region susceptible to large-
scale military competition…Maintaining a stable balance in Asia will be a 
complex task.  The possibility exists that a military competitor with a 
formidable resource base will emerge in this region.2 
The clear implication of these two statements is that the U.S. must dissuade 
China, the only possible “military competitor” with a “formidable resource base,” from 
developing systems that could target U.S. military strengths, above all in a Taiwan 
conflict, the issue on which U.S. and Chinese interests conflict most directly.   
This thesis is concerned with the problem of dissuasion as it applies to Chinese 
space systems.  Since 1979, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) leadership has 
undertaken serious efforts to modernize the Red Army, although recent U.S. military 
operations starting with Desert Storm in 1991 and concluding in 2003 with Iraqi Freedom 
“stunned” the Chinese High Command with just how far behind they remain from 
                                                 
1 The National Defense Strategy (NDS) of the United States of America, Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), Washington DC.  Mar 05, p. iv.  
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf (accessed 19 May 05) 
2 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Washington 
DC. 30 Sep 01, p. 4.  http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr2001.pdf (accessed 19 May 05) 
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achieving the level of military might enjoyed by America.  Consequently, the PRC 
modified its primary objective for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) from being 
prepared to execute a “people’s war under modern conditions” to “winning a limited war 
under high-tech conditions.”3  A key component of this effort is the modernization of 
PRC space capabilities, which encompasses the ability to harness the advantages of space 
operations as well as deny those advantages to adversaries.  Counterspace weapons such 
as ground-based satellite jammers constitute an especially fruitful area where China may 
seek to exploit U.S. weaknesses.  These modernization efforts present an emerging threat 
to space systems upon which American military power is heavily dependent. 
B. U.S. MILITARY’S DEPENDENCY ON SPACE 
The evolution of space systems from unfunded pet projects of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries to WWII terror devices to Cold War nuclear war stabilizers 
caused space systems to take on specific missions.  In fact, space systems such as the 
CORONA photoreconnaissance satellites and the Defense Support Program (DSP) 
missile warning spacecraft proved instrumental in supporting Cold War decision making 
and stability.  Subsequently, these Cold War devices merged into U.S. conventional force 
operations and ultimately a strong dependency developed for the services provided by 
space systems.  Yet, the fact that these devices were still relatively unknown and based 
on Cold War requirements caused many U.S. civilian and military leaders to recognize 
the potential for even greater improvements in air, land, and sea force effectiveness once 
newer space systems were acquired through a modern requirements process.   
Therefore, remote sensing and other intelligence platforms, the global positioning 
system (GPS), weather satellites and satellite communications (SATCOM) all found their 
niche further embedded in the U.S. conventional force doctrine.  Today multiple U.S. 
military documents, both joint and service specific, spell out the criticality of space in 
combat operations.4   
 
                                                 
3 David Shambaugh, Modernizing China’s Military:  Progress, Problems, and Prospects.  (Berkeley, 
CA:  University of California Press, 2004), pp. 2-3 
4 For a more thorough examination on the evolution of space systems see Appendix. 
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This publication provides guidelines for planning and conducting joint 
space operations.  It provides space doctrine fundamentals for all 
warfighters — air, land, sea, space, and special operations forces; 
describes the military operational principles associated with support from 
and through space, and operating in space; explains U.S. Space Command 
relationships and responsibilities; and establishes a framework for the 
employment of space forces and space capabilities.5 
A number of data points underscore U.S. dependency on space as well as its 
integration into operations across the entire spectrum of U.S. forces.  The GPS precision 
guided munitions (PGM) used in both Desert Strom and Iraqi Freedom demonstrates this 
point.  In Desert Strom 8% of munitions were PGM6, as compared to 68% in Iraqi 
freedom.7  In addition to supporting PGM, GPS also aides in the prevention of fratricide, 
enhances close air support (CAS) employment, and fosters economy of force through 
successful blue force tracking (BFT) capabilities among other benefits.8 
Satellite communications (SATCOM) usage levels also emphasizes the significant 
U.S. dependence on Space operations.  U.S. reliance on satellite communications during 
Desert Strom was paltry: one Mbps per every 5,000 troops deployed.  For Iraqi Freedom 
that number swelled to 51.1 Mbps.9  The massive SATCOM bandwidth requirement 
supported such activities as Iraqi target imagery dissemination, Combined and Joint C2, 
Predator UAV data feeds, and Combatant Commander video-teleconferences.   
Another data point to consider when discussing U.S. dependency on space is 
people.  U.S. space requirements have grown at such a rate that several large and costly 
organizations have developed to handle these programs.  For example, the lead agent for 
U.S. military space is Air Force Space Command, which is based out of Colorado 
                                                 
5 Joint Publication (JP) 3-14 Space Operations. The Joint Staff, Washington DC, 9 Aug 02, p. I, 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp3_14.pdf (accessed 19 May 05) 
6 “Operation DESERT STORM: Evaluation of the Air Campaign.” Letter Report, Government 
Accounting Office (GAO)/NSIAD-97-134, 12 Jun 97 
7 Mosley, Michael, “Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – By the Numbers.” Assessment and Analysis 
Division, U.S. Central Command Air Forces (USCENTAF), Shaw AFB, SC, 30 Apr 03 
8 French, Matthew, “General Points way to Better Blue Force.” Federal Computer Week (FCW),  21 
Oct 03.  http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2003/1020/web-oif-10-21-03.asp (accessed 19 May 05) 
9 Rayermann, Patrick, “Exploiting Commercial SATCOM: A Better Way.” Parameters, Vol 33, No. 4 
(Winter 2003-04), pp. 54-66.  http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/03winter/rayerman.pdf 
(accessed 19 May 05) 
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Springs Colorado and consists of nearly 40,000 personnel.10  These forces are responsible 
for a number of space operations that includes missile warning, satellite communications 
(SATCOM), and GPS operations.  In addition, the entire functional combatant command 
of U.S. Strategic Command is dedicated to nuclear and space warfare.  Lastly, the money 
trail for space acquisition implies that this realm of operations is every bit as important as 
air, land, and sea.   
Consider that of the $60+ billion in major 2006 defense acquisition programs, 
from the F/A-22 to Patriot missiles to AEGIS destroyers, space programs account for 
over 10% of this budget.  Or, consider that at $6.3 billion, space program procurement is 
more than twice that of the carrier replacement program, DD(X) destroyer, AEGIS 
destroyer, and littoral combat ship’s combined expenses.  And, the outlays for improved 
SATCOM systems will more than double that spent on the B-2, F-15E, and F-16 
aircraft.11  Opponents to increased space program funding can present logical arguments 
as to why limited defense dollars should concentrate elsewhere.  However, at a minimum, 
the substantial amount of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) funds earmarked for space 
programs represents a commitment by senior U.S. leadership that American forces will 
depend on these systems in future operations.    
C. DESIGNING DEFENSE POLICIES 
Figure 1 shows one possible approach to the cause-effect relationship between 
defense policies and strategic challenges facing the U.S.  Since the first Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT), the two superpowers recognized the futility of the nuclear arms 
race.12  In essence, a limited number of nuclear weapons were agreeable between the two 
sides.  As depicted in the top line of Figure 1, deterrence’s affect is sufficient when 
directed towards other nuclear-armed states.  The fact that no nuclear war has occurred 
                                                 
10 USAF Space Command Commander’s Biography.  Peterson AFB, CO, Jan 05.  
http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=6232  (accessed 19 May 05) 
11 Department of Defense (DoD) Program Acquisition Costs by Weapon System, DoD Budget for 
Fiscal Year 2006.  Comptroller for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Washington DC, Feb 05, 
pp. 1-3.  http://www.dod.mil/comptroller/defbudget/fy2006/fy2006_weabook.pdf (accessed 19 May 05) 
12 The following U.S. State Department links contain information on SALT:  
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt1.html (SALT I), 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2-1.html (SALT II), and 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/arms/treaties/salt2-2.html (SALT II) (accessed 29 May 05) 
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supports this position.  However, the consequence of nuclear arms reduction treaties like 
SALT and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is that more money is available 
for conventional or traditional types of forces.13  Fortunately, from an American 
perspective, defense policies against these types of challenges are extremely effective 
since the U.S. conventional military possess such overwhelming strength.  Yet, this 
causes another cascade of adversary money, although this time it is from traditional 
weapons to irregular or disruptive challenges such as insurgency or cyber warfare.  
Unfortunately, the U.S. has proven to be ill equipped to handle these types of challenges.  
It is for this reason that U.S. policy makers created the strategy of dissuasion in hopes 
that it can counter challenges not normally considered U.S. strengths. 
 
Figure 1.   Relative Strength of Traditional U.S. Defense Policies versus Relative Strength of 
Strategic Challenges14 
 
These factors are partially responsible for the policies outlined in recent U.S. 
documents such as the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), 2001 Quadrennial 
                                                 
13 The following U.S. State Department link contains the complete START documentation:  
http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/18535.htm (accessed 29 May 05) 
14 The 2005 NDS describes the four “strategic challenges” in more detail. 
Catastrophic Challenges 
Traditional Challenges 






Deterrence / Defeat  
$$$ 
 6
Defense Review (QDR), 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS), and 2004 National 
Military Strategy (NMS).  In the end, these documents provide a framework for the 
various activities that support U.S. security like service budgets, military war planning, 
and foreign diplomacy.  Dissuasion represents one specific defense policy prescribed by 
these documents.  Chapter II analyzes this policy and highlights its key traits, but one 
issue is worth mentioning now.  The amount of literature and understanding on exactly 
what dissuasion entails or seeks to accomplish is extremely limited.  Of equal concern is 
the fact that none of the aforementioned U.S. policy documents provides any semblance 
of an executable strategy for this new concept.  While not a conclusion that addresses the 
main question of this thesis, it is worth noting that as a policy prescription dissuasion 
requires much more discussion, analysis, and most importantly guidance from U.S. senior 
administrators in the DoD, State Department, and White House. 
Nonetheless, it seems logical that the genesis of dissuasion reaches back to the 
Cold War and that one of this policy’s targets is China’s counter space technologies.  
Mindful of the large costs associated with the superpower stare downs of the twentieth 
century, the U.S. sought to develop a policy that avoids arms races before they have a 
chance to begin.  Since the other mediums of operation already nurture on-going battles 
for improved air, land, and sea-based weapon systems, its application in those domains 
seems less apparent.  In addition, many individuals, nations, and international groups are 
against the weaponization of space.  Conversely, the international community does not 
view the buildup of improved tanks, airplanes, and ships as illegal.  Moreover, no known 
destructive weapons exist in space.  Speculation as well as research and development 
programs are looking at weapons that could orbit the earth and actually destroy other 
satellites or fire lasers back onto earth.  However, when compared to its more mature 
counterparts, space is relatively free of weapons.  This sanctity appeals to some and 









This main chapters of this thesis fall into three distinct sections.  Chapter II 
discusses in more detail why dissuasion is a defense policy option and its objective as a 
military strategy.  This chapter relies heavily on deterrence literature and logic in 
establishing the foundation of dissuasion.  At times the line between deterrence and 
dissuasion may seem unclear, and while this chapter may not necessarily clear up this 
confusion it will at a minimum analyze and identify the similar traits of these two defense 
policies.  Furthermore, this chapter traces the roots of dissuasion through recent historical 
security issues confronting the U.S. and its allies to provide a sense as to why U.S. policy 
makers are promoting this new policy.  The conclusion of Chapter II summarizes why 
dissuasion is not just a U.S. defense policy in a broad sense, but why U.S. policy makers 
considered it the ideal choice to tackle the potential threat of Chinese counter space 
systems. 
Chapter III analyzes China’s space program.  To accomplish this objective, this 
chapter introduces some basic concepts to space operations, such as the primary elements 
that comprise a space system.  Understanding the basic elements of a space system is 
necessary for any policy that seeks to protect space systems.  Simply protecting one 
element may not be enough to guarantee access to the space capabilities the U.S. has 
come to enjoy.  Next, this chapter explores the difficulty of dissuading space systems and 
more specifically, why the dissuasion of counter space weapons represents the most 
probable chance for success.  Finally, Chapter III examines the current space weapons 
China is likely to possess or seek to develop in the future. 
Chapter IV uses past strategic cases as well as current defense policy theories to 
propose conditions necessary for dissuasion to succeed.  In essence, these conditions for 
success are broken down into military, economic, and diplomatic conditions with each 
one containing multiple sub-conditions or criterion.  Aside from the conditions presented, 
this chapter emphasizes that the prospects for dissuasion to succeed cannot be easily 
computed like a linear equation.  Even though this thesis develops logical situations  
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where dissuasion may work, it is much more difficult to account for the actual decision-
making and reaction to decisions made by state’s leaders.  In essence, judgment and risk 
are crucial components of any policy. 
Chapter V assesses the prospects for success in dissuading China’s counter space 
systems.  Unfortunately, the answer to this dilemma is that dissuasion will not succeed in 
stopping the Chinese from producing these types of systems.  However, the concluding 
chapter as well as entire thesis takes the reader through an in-depth and honest analysis 










Like other political options, defense policies represent one set of tools to advance 
and protect U.S. interests.  Reflection and analysis of the past contributes to the policy 
process by allowing U.S. leaders to revise policies to better address current and future 
security requirements.  One way to communicate these updates is through formal U.S. 
strategic policy documents, such as the National Security Strategy (NSS) and 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  For example, the 2002 NSS issued by President 
Bush set a new course for U.S. policy makers.   
Today, the United States enjoys a position of unparalleled military 
strength and great economic and political influence.  In keeping with our 
heritage and principles, we do not use our strength to press for unilateral 
advantage.  We seek instead to create a balance of power that favors 
human freedom; conditions in which all nations and all societies can 
choose for themselves the rewards and challenges of political and 
economic liberty.   
Portions of this recent guidance call upon older policies that have proven 
successful in the past while simultaneously advocating for the implementation of a new 
policy to address the changing dynamics of the twenty first century.  Consequently, the 
next statement made by President Bush in the NSS provided clear direction for future 
U.S. defense policies. 
We will defend the peace by fighting terrorists and tyrants.  We will 
preserve the peace by building good relations among great powers.  We 
will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every 
continent.15 
While these three statements do not explicitly refer to the concepts of assurance, 
dissuasion, deterrence, and defeat, they do make a strong case for them.  The U.S. will 
“defend…by fighting,” “preserve…by building,” and “extend…by encouraging.”  These 
ideas provide a departure point for subsequent and more specific defense planning 
                                                 
15 The National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States of America, The White House, 
Washington DC, 17 Sep 2002, p. iv, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (accessed 8 May 05) 
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guidance.  Clearly, the more traditional defense policies of assurance, deterrence, and 
defeat resonate in the terms “defend” and “preserve.”  However, the notion of 
“extend[ing]” the peace through “encouraging” friendly atmospheres is a pillar of the 
relatively new defense policy called dissuasion.   
B. WHY DISSUASION? 
Recognizing the risk of provocation that comes with policies such as deterrence is 
one factor that caused U.S. leaders to re-examine past policies in search of something that 
better achieves a more productive relationship between states.  Security studies expert 
Patrick Morgan summarizes the common distractions and unintended consequences of 
deterrence.   
We do not want deterrence to work in such a way that it is provocative and 
produces, rather than prevents, disastrous conflicts – which are the 
stability problem in its various forms…We do not want deterrence to 
shape the endless security dilemma…We do not want deterrence to drive 
out the alternatives that are available for the better management of global, 
regional, and national security.16 
Unfortunately, at times, other less aggressive policies have also proven 
counterproductive.  The most notable being the appeasement policies of pre-WWII.  
Designed to quell the aggressive interests of Hitler and his Nazi regime, appeasement 
simply provided Germany unfettered opportunities to deepen its pre-war buildup.  
Historian Gordon Craig analyzes the negative consequences of appeasement 
Germany truly intended on being naughty and she would go on being so as 
long as there was no compelling reason to change her ways…In 
September 1938 Hitler was well on his way to realizing the program laid 
down on 5 November 1937; and there seemed no possibility after Munich 
that anyone would object seriously to future depredations.17 
The disaster of WWII serves as a frightful reminder that even non-aggressive 
approaches can also contribute to unsatisfactory policy results.  Placing these two policies 
on a spectrum as shown in Figure 2 illustrates that room exists for a policy that lies 
                                                 
16 Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now.  (Cambridge, UK:  Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 286-
287 
17 Gordon Craig, “High Tide to Appeasement:  The Road to Munich 1937-1938.”  Political Science 
Quarterly, Vol. 65 No. 1 (March 1950).  pp. 20, 37 
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somewhere between the two.  A policy in this area could possibly better address some of 
the indeterminate security requirements currently facing the U.S.  Dissuasion may 
represent the most appropriate tool for dealing with states that fall between outright 
adversary and close ally.  In addition, dissuasion affords leaders a more viable option for 
an exit strategy, a classic criticism of deterrence-based policies, should the intended 
target state respond favorably with peaceful assurances. 
 
Figure 2.   Defense Policy Spectrum 
In light of these reasons, among others, the 2002 NSS of the U.S. dictates the use 
of dissuasion.18  Moreover, the 2001 QDR, 2004 National Military Strategy (NMS), and 
2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) echo the same strategic methods as the NSS and 
clearly identify dissuasion as a defense policy.19  As such, U.S. civilian and military 
leaders are directed to implement dissuasion when and where necessary.   
C. THE TARGETS OF DISSUASION 
The targets of U.S. defense policies can be broken into three types of threats: 
emerging, existing, and engaged.  Ideally, as depicted in Figure 3, a specific defense 
policy counters each of these threats.  However, a distinguishing characteristic is that 
                                                 
18 2002 NSS, p. 29 
19 2001 QDR, pp. 11-12; 2004 National Military Strategy, Joint Chiefs of Staff, DoD, Washington 
DC, pp. 2, 9, 1, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nms.pdf (accessed 19 May 05); 
2005 NDS, pp. iv, 7 
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policies other than dissuasion all represent strategies aimed at current security situations.  
The U.S. assures its allies that it will support them against “existing” aggressive regimes, 
the U.S. deters “existing” adversaries from attempting coercion or harmful influence, and 
when necessary the U.S. defeats “existing” enemies on the battlefield.  Conversely, 
according to the 2005 NDS, the U.S.  
Seeks to limit would-be opponent’s strategic options and dissuade them 
from adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions.20   
This explains a unique quality of dissuasion, that as a defense policy it seeks to 
reduce the likelihood that new adversaries will “emerge” or if they do “emerge” that they 
will be equipped with less capability.  This is consistent with the overall guidance put 
forth by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld 
This strategy emphasizes the importance of influencing events before 
challenges become more dangerous and less manageable.21 
This is a clear reflection on the difficulties associated with past U.S. defense 
policies and the common security dilemmas that transpired from previous deterrence-
focused strategies whose foundations were based on waiting for threats to develop first, 
then engage second.  Robert Kaplan describes this situation as “deterring China without 
needlessly provoking it.”22  Moreover, the current commander of the U.S. Pacific 
Command, Admiral Fallon, recently appeared before the House Armed Services 
Committee and discussed the delicate nature of China-Taiwan relations and the role that 
U.S. influence may play in “diffusing the tension and moving forward.”23 
                                                 
20 2005 NDS, p. 7 
21 Ibid, p. iii 
22 Robert Kaplan, “How We Would Fight China,” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol 295, Issue 5, June 05, p. 
54 
23 “Counterterrorism, Military Readiness Among Top U.S. Priorities,” US Federal News, Washington, 
4 Apr 05 
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Figure 3.   U.S. Defense Policies and Respective Targets 
Table 1. U.S. Defense Policy Breakdown 
 
Until dissuasion, no policy goal explicitly sought to reduce the number of threats, 
whether the threats exist at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels.  Instead, they were 
designed to simply deal with threats at hand.  Assurance, deterrence, and defeat assume 
that the U.S. will always have dangerously armed belligerents to manage.  On the other 
hand, successful dissuasion may reduce the need for the other defense policy goals.  
Furthermore, policies often work best when integrated into a cohesive strategy that taps 
into the unique attributes of each specific policy.  It is hard to imagine dissuasion 
working properly without the support of deterrence, assurance, and defeat, especially 
given the highly complex nature of the global environment.  In fact, a broad strategic plan 
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that uses the wide-ranging utility of multiple defense policies is more likely to meet the 
diverse challenges of current security situations. 
For example, the U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities immediately 
following WWII served notice to any aggressor that America possessed the means to 
defeat even the most well armed nation.  Combined with the assurance policies of the 
U.S. to its NATO partners the collective power of these two policies (assurance and 
defeat) created a more favorable environment for deterrence.  However, this logic also 
bolstered the Soviets deterrence policies.  The USSR demonstrated credible defeat-type 
qualities during WWII and the subsequent force build-up in Eastern Block countries 
assured the U.S. and others that the USSR was committed to the region.  Consequently, 
these policy attributes afforded the Soviets certain degrees of credibility from which their 
deterrence policies could more effectively operate. 
D. DEFINING DISSUASION 
To understand the benefits of dissuasion better it is useful to compare it against 
other defense policy goals to highlight its unique attributes.  Some of this comparison 
already took place in the introduction to this chapter.  However, in addition to the nature 
of the relationship and the intended policy set, additional discussion will help to 
differentiate between dissuasion and its older counterparts. 
1. Defeat 
On one extreme of the U.S. defense policy spectrum is defeat (reference Figure 
2), which represents the least desirable and most costly option.  Yet, to uphold treaty 
obligations and prevent  
The efforts of adversaries to impose their will on the United States, its 
allies, or friends 
Defeat may be the only option left that will preserve national security.24  WWII, 
Korea, and the first Gulf War all represent examples of the U.S. carrying out defeat-based 
defense policies, some more successfully than others.  In addition, U.S. policy towards 
each of these conflicts carried with it specific policy objectives.  WWII represented 
unlimited warfare with only the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers (i.e., 
                                                 
24 2001 QDR, p. 13 
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“traditional” strategic challenges) satisfying U.S. objectives.  The first Gulf War had 
more limited objectives, which arose primarily from the diverse interests of states that 
comprised the fragile coalition.  Nonetheless, the Gulf War still sought the defeat of a 
“traditional” type of strategic threat. 
More recently, Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was conducted as part of a broader 
defense policy to defeat a “traditional” threat, although a primary objective of OIF was to 
reduce the number of “catastrophic” threats (i.e., WMD) in the Middle East.  
Unfortunately, one unintended consequence of OIF is the increase in the number of 
“irregular” (i.e., insurgency and terrorism) threats in the region.25  This highlights a 
consequence of U.S. military superiority in that it drives allies and adversaries to pursue 
means of warfare that avoid this strength by targeting a weakness (i.e., asymmetric 
warfare).   
2. Assurance 
On the opposite end of the defense policy spectrum (reference Figure 2) is 
assurance.  According to the 2002 NSS and 2001 QDR, the U.S. will “assure our allies 
and friends” that they do not stand alone in the face of aggression or other potential 
threats.26  Specifically,  
The U.S. military plays a critical role in assuring allies and friends that the 
Nation will honor its obligations and will be a reliable security partner.27   
The U.S. position within NATO during the early years of the nuclear arms race 
provides a good example of this type of defense policy goal.  By providing economic aid, 
conventional forces, as well as nuclear weapons, the U.S. demonstrated its commitment 
to stand by its NATO allies who were facing Soviet conventional and strategic forces.  
Consequently, the strong assurances provided to these Western European states allowed 
them to feel more protected, allocate sparse resources towards other programs, and 
bolster the U.S.’s position as a provider of global security. 
                                                 
25 2005 NDS, p. 8 
26 2002 NSS, p. 29 and 2001 QDR, p. 11 
27 2001 QDR, p. 11 
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The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 represents another U.S. assurance policy 
aimed at reducing the likelihood of a regional security dilemma.  In response to the ebbs 
and flows of the historic China and Taiwan reunification conflict, the U.S. enacted a 
policy that assured Taiwan that they did not stand alone in the face of forceful attempts to 
reunify.28  Furthermore, the policy provided “reassurance through restraint” that the U.S. 
would support peaceful resolutions with respect to China – Taiwan relations, but would 
act defensively if deemed necessary.  Combined with the power projection capabilities of 
the Pentagon, and the most recent defeat of aggressive regimes (i.e., Milosevic and 
Hussein) by U.S.-led forces, American policies with respect to the China – Taiwan issue 
carry a great deal of credibility.   
Assurance is about building and fostering productive relationships in an effort to 
bolster economic, diplomatic, and other non-military type activities.  In addition, even 
though there is a military aspect to assurance policies, it is not an “in your face” type of 
involvement.  Instead, it lurks behind the scenes while other strategic actions take front 
stage.  One only needs to examine the highly productive relationship that exists between 
the U.S. and its closest allies to see the potential of assurance.  Interestingly, the U.S.-
Japan and U.S.-German assurance policies since the end of WWII have allowed both 
Japan and Germany to grow into modern industrial and intellectual giants.  Of course, 
prior to WWII both of these states were strong geopolitical powers, but the aggressive 
nature of each state put it at odds with the U.S.  Therefore, assurance sees competing 
interests much more like a win-win situation and not a zero-sum equation. 
3. Deterrence 
Unlike defeat and assurance, which lay on the outer edges of the defense policy 
spectrum, deterrence is closer to the middle, although it leans more towards defeat than 
assurance (reference Figure 2).  In addition, when states start to consider deterrence type 
policies then the win-win potential of assurance quickly dissolves into a lose-lose 
scenario.  Granted deterrence can prevent wars of monumental costs from taking place, 
but it simply does not allow for the productive type of relationships that exist under 
                                                 
28 Taiwan Relations Act, Public Law 96-8, 96th U.S. Congress, 10 Apr 79, 
http://usinfo.state.gov/eap/Archive_Index/Taiwan_Relations_Act.html  (accessed 8 May 05) 
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assurance.  Nonetheless, deterrence served as the U.S. military’s primary objective during 
much of the Cold War.  With both superpowers arraying vast arsenals of nuclear weapons 
at each other neither one was prepared to accept the consequences of atomic warfare, in 
effect, the weapon systems and political policies of each nation deterred nuclear war as 
well as WWIII.  The 2001 QDR defines deterrence as  
A multifaceted approach…that requires forces and capabilities that 
provide the President with a wider range of military options to discourage 
aggression or any form of coercion.29   
Using terminology from the 2005 NDS, the design of Cold War defense policies 
primarily deterred the “catastrophic” challenges presented by nuclear weapons.30     
Lawrence Freedman stated in his 2004 book titled Deterrence that in the past 
Deterrence anticipated aggression, and therefore guarded against being 
caught by surprise, but it could still be presented as essentially reactive.31   
One only needs to look at the action words of this description to get a sense of when and 
against whom to apply deterrence.  “Aggression” implies an adversarial state while 
“guarded,” “surprise,” and “reactive” detail a situation of insecurity where states mass 
forces along the border because of the distrusting or competing nature of the 
environment.  
This highlights two key assumptions when constructing deterrence policies.  First, 
that the target of deterrence is hostile or aggressive towards U.S. interests.  Second, that 
the aggressive behavior is known and consists of military forces arrayed within striking 
distance from those interests.  If hostilities have already commenced the value of 
deterrence lessens.  If two states are close allies then this policy seems to have minimal 
utility. 
According to Freedman there are two approaches that deterrence can take which 
will influence behavior.  It can either prevent adversary action through denial or 
                                                 
29 2001 QDR, p. 12 
30 2005 NDS 
31 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence.  (Malden, MA:  Polity Press, 2004), p. 11 
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punishment.  This is similar to the carrot and stick analogy where a state will either be 
denied the carrot or punished with the stick, although neither seems very appealing which 
underscores the objective of deterrence.  Efforts by states to not recognize or negotiate 
with terrorists are examples of a denial-based deterrence approach.  The idea is that a 
state withholds from the aggressor something they want in order to prevent or deter the 
aggressor from taking undesirable actions.  In the case of terrorism, the U.S. hopes that 
terrorists will avoid carrying out certain actions because the international community will 
prevent them from joining its organizations if they do.  Conversely, deterrence by 
punishment is based on the notion that the costs of action outweigh any potential benefits 
(i.e., you’ll suffer more than its worth).32  This is the more common application of 
deterrence and embodies the main precept of nuclear deterrence.  Neither superpower 
was willing to risk nuclear war because the economic, political, and domestic costs far 
outweighed any conceivable gains made by destroying the other side.  This also serves to 
illuminate the confrontational nature of this policy, which Patrick Morgan summarizes in 
the following statement. 
Yet deterrence remains an important tool for failed relationships and 
communities – it is not ideally our first choice, but more like a recourse.33   
The numerous instances of deterrence and not just nuclear deterrence provide more of the 
same confrontational brinksmanship.   
In the historical application of deterrence, three common criteria are evident: an 
effective military capability, the capability to impose unacceptable costs, and the 
willingness to use these capabilities if attacked.34  These criteria re-enforce the hostile 
nature of deterrence, the security dilemma that it usually creates, and ultimately the 
unproductive diplomatic environment fostered by such a strategy.  Security expert Robert 
Jervis explains a key component of deterrence is the ability to recognize the enemy’s 
intentions because 
                                                 
32 Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence, p. 15 
33 Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now, p. xix 
34 Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now, p. 4 
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The central argument that great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that 
the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve and that the state 
must display the ability and willingness to wage war.35   
Jervis’ point and a key factor in any deterrence policy is that certain states respond to the 
threat of force.  Therefore, deterrence can be used to achieve national strategy if it is used 
against the correct type of enemy.  A thorough understanding of intentions puts leaders in 
better position to determine if a given state is a candidate for deterrence or if some other 
type of policy, such as engagement, may be more appropriate.   
Another security expert, John Ikenberry introduces the concept of “strategic 
restraint” in an effort to lessen the need for deterrence policies.  His concept proposes that 
states seek to bind their own limits through international institutions.36  In addition, 
Janice Stein and Lawrence Freedman in separate writings underscore the logic of 
deterrence by asserting common deterrence assumptions primarily based on a cost-benefit 
model.37  Looking back at these experts’ opinions on deterrence reveals that it is a highly 
complex policy requiring a clear understanding of the opposing state.  Furthermore, they 
all emphasize the fact that deterrence takes place between belligerents with existing 
threatening capabilities and intentions that usually consist of traditional and/or 
catastrophic weapon systems. 
4. Dissuasion 
In retrospect, the policies of assurance, deterrence, and defeat feel familiar to U.S. 
strategists because they achieved success in the past.  Threats exist in the world and will 
arguably always exist.  Therefore, these policies will have a place at the bargaining table 
when deciding on national security strategies.  However, these policy options are often 
expensive, destabilizing, and deadly.  Dissuasion, on the other hand, is an attempt to curb 
the number of strategic, operational, and tactical threats future policy makers will face, 
and in turn lessen the overall need for assurance, deterrence, and defeat.  The U.S. has 
                                                 
35 Robert Jervis, “Deterrence, the Spiral Model, and Intentions of the Adversary,” Perception and 
Misperception in International Politics.  (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), Ch. 3 
36 G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major 
Wars. (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001) 
37 Janice Stein “Deterrence and Reassurance,” in Philip E. Tetlock et al., eds., Behavior, Society, and 
Nuclear War, vol. II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991) and Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence 
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more friends than enemies, but even so, most states do not fall consistently into either of 
these categories (reference Figure 4).  Traditional U.S. defense policies do not seem to 
afford an effective means for dealing with these types of states.  Become too friendly 
with assurances and an aggressive state can simply act unfettered, but become too hostile 
with deterrence and then little room is available to back out of a security dilemma.  To 
better addresses the current environment and avoid some of the problems with other 
defense policies, U.S. leaders coined the notion of dissuasion.  Professor Richard Kugler 
of the National Defense University (NDU) summarizes the rationale for dissuasion.  
It offers a potent concept for handling geopolitical situations in which U.S. 
relationships with key countries fall short of overt rivalry but can 
deteriorate if strategic and military competition takes hold.38 
 
Figure 4.   Defense Policy Gray Area (Friend or Foe?) 
 
A review of current U.S. strategic guidance (e.g., 2001 QDR, 2002 NSS, 2004 
NMS, and 2005 NDS) provides a very brief and broad overview as to how U.S. policy 
makers view the implementation and execution of dissuasion.  The 2002 NSS states that 
“our military must dissuade future military competition,” the 2001 QDR states that  
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dissuasion “influences the nature of military competition, channels threats in certain 
directions, and complicates military planning for potential adversaries.”  Furthermore, the 
2005 NDS dictates that the U.S. military  
Will work to dissuade potential adversaries from adopting threatening 
capabilities, methods, and ambitions, particularly by developing our own 
key military advantages.39   
However, dissuasion is a relatively new term and its actual use in existing or 
previous policies is unknown.  Some analysts point to ballistic missile defense (BMD), 
while still others point to the U.S. Navy as forms of dissuasion.40  In theory, a functional 
BMD system would drive aggressors away from procuring and producing WMD-tipped 
ICBMs targeting the U.S.  In fact, this is one of the primary reasons that President 
Reagan pursued the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1983.  Additionally, not only 
would SDI render adversary nuclear missiles irrelevant, it would provide the ultimate 
protection to America’s population.41  Nevertheless, once faced with SDI, aggressors are 
likely to put the WMD device on a boat, airplane, or develop within America’s borders.   
U.S. maritime capability represents another possible example of dissuasion and in 
theory, the American naval fleet is so strong that it has in essence dissuaded other nations 
from developing comparable fleets.  Undoubtedly, the U.S. is the only nation on earth 
capable of projecting multiple large carrier strike groups in all major waterways.  
However, one result of this dissuasion has been an increase in the number of states that 
have mini-subs and anti-ship missiles.  In addition, while not necessarily a direct result of 
the U.S. Navy, the PLA Navy (PLAN) is pursuing a blue water capability, although it 
would take decades to achieve the quality of U.S. naval operations.  Still, these actions 
seem to go against the desired end state of dissuasion. 
                                                 
39 2005 NDS, p. iv 
40 Pete Lavoy, Barry Zellen, and Chris Clary, “Dissuasion in U.S. Defense Strategy,” Dissuasion in 
U.S. Defense Strategy Conference Report, Strategic Insights, Vol III, Issue 10 (Oct 04), Center for 
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41 Steven Hook and John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II, Sixteenth Edition.  
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These two cases underscore the likelihood that dissuasion will spur the growth of 
asymmetric warfare much the same way that U.S. conventional force dominance has 
spurred a rise in terrorism and insurgency, two means of warfare that the U.S. handles 
poorly.  In either case, no policy maker or strategist has previously stated that U.S. 
involvement or policies in these defense programs are part of a much broader dissuasive 
campaign.  Dissuasion is still a relatively new policy and its record of accomplishment in 
strategy employment and policy results are difficult to measure.  Examining past cases in 
which the concept can be observed to have operated, even if the term itself did not exist, 
may provide insight into possible benefits and consequences of this policy. 
While past events can help explain dissuasion’s objective, it is future threats that 
truly comprise this policy’s intended target set.  According to the 2001 QDR, dissuasion 
targets “future military competition.”  Moreover, the 2001 QDR states that to 
Have a dissuasive effect, this combination of technical, experimental, and 
operational activity has to have a clear strategic focus.42   
In addition, the 2001 QDR describes dissuasion as having a “channeling” affect due to 
superior U.S. technological strengths.43  The downside of a policy that advocates the 
bolstering of an existing strength is that it drives adversaries to find U.S. weaknesses.  It 
is not feasible to consider dissuasion in relation to every conceivable military threat.  
While the U.S. economy remains robust, it does have limits, and U.S. leaders must chose 
judiciously where defense dollars are spent.  Designers of U.S. defense policy must 
provide a “clear strategic focus” by identifying those emerging systems that present the 
greatest threat to U.S. security.44  In addition, they need to weigh these future threats 
against the probability of dissuasion being a successful policy.  While dissuasion may 
cause an adversary to avoid certain types of weapons, U.S. policy makers must address 
critical questions: “What will the adversary pursue instead” and “Is it possible that the 
asymmetrical choices they make are worse for the U.S. then if dissuasion had not been 
                                                 
42 2001 QDR, p. 11 
43 2001 QDR, p. 12 
44 2001 QDR, p. 12 
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implemented?”  The Chinese military space program is an example of an emerging threat, 
in relation to which a strategy of dissuasion may offer some promise of success.   
Dissuasion represents a different approach to achieving strategic objectives in a 
rivalry-based global environment.  According to the 2005 NDS dissuasion targets 
potential adversaries in an effort to discourage them 
From adopting threatening capabilities, methods, and ambitions, 
particularly by developing our own key military advantages.45 
In his book Astropolitik, Everett Dolman advocates an elaborate space-based dissuasive 
strategy where the U.S. dominates satellite orbits so thoroughly with space weapons 
capable of shooting down adversarial space systems that no aggressor or enemy of the 
U.S. is capable of fielding a space platform, regardless of its proposed intentions, without 
America’s consent.46  A key difference between the two policies is that dissuasion tries to 
pre-empt the production of weapon systems where as deterrence assumes the weapon 
system already exists or will exist shortly.  Moreover, dissuasion applies to U.S. allies 
who might wish to acquire weapon systems perceived as detrimental to U.S. policies (i.e., 
regional arms race).  In certain situations, older, more traditional defense policies are the 
appropriate policy solution to achieve national security.  However, in other situations, 
dissuasion may afford the best chance at maintaining U.S. interests as well as gaining a 
potential ally. 
E. U.S. DEFENSE POLICIES AND THE CHINA-TAIWAN ISSUE 
Some security experts believe that dissuasion was devised specifically to deal 
with China, a state that at times acts like an adversary to U.S. interests, but still at other 
times acts like a friend.47  Therefore, the current China-Taiwan reunification issue serves 
as a good test case to demonstrate the application of U.S. defense policies as well as 
further illustrate the potential of dissuasion.  In addition to the definitions provided above 
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46 Everett Dolman, Astropolitik: Classic Geopolitics in the Space Age.  (London; Portland, OR: Frank 
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as well as the defense policy targets shown in Figure 3, this section breaks down the 
application of defense policies across strategic, operational, and tactical levels.  One 
caveat is that this analysis does not exhaust all the possible applications of U.S. defense 
policies with respect to the China-Taiwan scenario.  Instead, it demonstrates one logical 
albeit simple application of an integrated defense strategy that comprises these policies, 
with particular emphasis on the less mature concept of dissuasion. 
Figure 4 illustrates the strategic level application of the U.S. defense policies 
towards China and Taiwan.  The U.S. actively assures Taiwan of its diplomatic, 
economic, and military support in the face of aggressive attempts by China to reunify.  In 
addition, the U.S. assures Taiwan that it should avoid making controversial statements 
and legal action that serves to antagonize the PRC.  Moreover, the U.S. dissuades China 
from pursuing aggressive approaches to reunification through a collage of military, 
foreign, and trade policies.  Simultaneously, the U.S. also maintains a well-armed 
regional force under the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) that serves as a deterrent to 
hostile PLA actions. 
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At the operational level, the U.S. takes similar steps to manage this situation as 
shown in Figure 5.  The PACOM, DoD, and State Department establish a variety of 
personal and professional networks with Taiwanese counterparts to strengthen the U.S. 
assurance policy.  In addition, the DoD takes selective steps to dissuade the PLA from 
fielding specific weapon systems.  As shown in Figure 6, one possible list of dissuasive 
targets is the space weapons mentioned in the 2005 NDS.  Therefore, U.S. leaders can 
attempt to take steps (e.g., enhance current technology, establish treaty forbidding 
specific space platforms, etc) to carry out a dissuasive policy.  Next, PACOM develops 
regional war plans and conducts frequent exercises and training missions to demonstrate 
the lethality of U.S. forces.  This serves notice to Beijing and the PLA that Washington 
and the Pentagon possess the capability to follow through with combat operations if 
necessary.  In other words, PACOM efforts at dissuasion are designed to show capability 
without being provocative. 
 
































Figure 7.   U.S. Dissuasion Policy and its Sub-Components48 
Since a host of tactical level operations take place for a given scenario, this 
discussion will use space systems to clarify the tactical level defense strategy depicted in 
Figure 7.  In the U.S. military, normally the Joint Forces Air Component Commander 
(JFACC) will control U.S. space forces during conflicts since this individual owns the 
preponderance of space assets and the means to control them.  Lacking a conflict, a 
combination of other U.S. military organizations will control space forces.  Nonetheless, 
the JFACC (as depicted in Figure 7) or some other U.S. leader will assure the Taiwanese 
of access to space.  In addition, the JFACC will attempt to dissuade the PLA from 
developing counter space systems that could undermine or negate U.S. space superiority.  
In concert, the JFACC will also provide the necessary offensive and defensive 
counterspace (OCS/DCS) forces to deter the PLA from using space.  Finally, if 
appropriate, the JFACC will execute his OCS systems and deny the PLA access to space. 
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Several factors contributed to the creation of dissuasion as a U.S. defense policy.  
Failed policies of past regimes and the misapplication of these policies each contributed 
to the realization that something different may be warranted.  In addition, there is a 
general recognition that some states currently lay within a gray area, where it is difficult 
to discern friend from foe.  In these cases, the misapplication of deterrence or assurance 
might lead to catastrophic results.  Therefore, U.S. strategists crafted a new defense 
policy to better account for these situations and re-enforce the overall integrated U.S. 
defense strategy with a policy that seeks to reduce the number of emerging threats, 
whether at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels. 
A brief examination of the more mature defense policies (i.e., assurance, 
deterrence, and defeat) helped to put the new concept of dissuasion into context.  Clearly, 
the characteristics that make up dissuasion represent some of the same ones that factor 
into deterrence and assurance.  Consequently, dissuasion provides a tool that capitalizes 
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harmony and not slip towards an aggressive relationship.  Unfortunately, current U.S. 
planning documents do not provide much explanation of how to implement a dissuasive 
strategy.   
This chapter has sought to develop a simple and logical case to demonstrate the 
possibility of a U.S. defense strategy targeting the China-Taiwan reunification issue.  At 
the strategic, operational, and tactical levels, each defense policy has a clear objective 
that targets a specific threat.  Assurance policies target allies, dissuasion targets emerging 
threats, deterrence targets existing threats, and defeat targets engaged threats.  Digging 
deeper into dissuasion reveals that it seeks to target threats predicted upon emerging 
capabilities, methods, or ambitions.  Depending on the level of analysis, this could be 
either a state, a non-state organization, or a potential weapon system.  For a possible 
China-Taiwan conflict, it is likely that the PLA will attempt to employ counter space 
technologies in an effort to degrade U.S. space superiority.  Since space weapon 
platforms are still an emerging threat, it makes sense to counter them with a dissuasive 
strategy.  The next chapter discusses China’s space program and the potential threat it 






III. SPACE OPERATIONS IN A SINO-AMERICAN CONFLICT 
A. BACKGROUND 
On October 15 2003, China became only the third nation to send a man into 
space.  Astronaut Lieutenant Colonel Lang Liwei’s 21-hour orbit made him an instant 
hero in China and reaffirmed Beijing’s commitment to modernize the PLA.  Observant 
during the Cold War, Desert Storm, Allied Force, Enduring Freedom, and Iraqi Freedom, 
Chinese leaders saw the affect of space support to air, land, and sea operations.  They 
witnessed the value of space enhancement across everything from basic command and 
control to intelligence gathering to weapon accuracy.  In a few instances, they have even 
begun to capitalize on this recognition.  Recent employment of advanced Feng Huo space 
command and control (C2) systems,49 new Fanhui Shi Weixing (FSW) space-based 
intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities,50 and most importantly, 
covert efforts to develop counter space systems and tactics aimed at negating an 
adversary’s space capability loom large on U.S. defense strategists’ minds.51  To create 
these counter space threats, China is developing, at its restricted space facility located in 
the Gobi desert,52 space weapons such as anti-satellite lasers and parasitic micro-
satellites.53  Using lexicon from the current U.S. defense establishment, these types of 
                                                 
49 Phillip Clark, “Civil and Commercial Satellite Communications – China,” Jane’s Space Directory, 
Jane’s Information Group, 8 Dec 04, 
http://www4.janes.com/subscribe/jsd/doc_view.jsp?K2DocKey=/content1/janesdata/yb/jsd/jsd_0154.htm@
current&Prod_Name=JSD&QueryText= (accessed 8 May 05) 
50 White Paper: Full Text of China’s Space Activities, 22 Nov 00, FBIS CPP20001122000046 
51 Fiscal Year 2004 Report To Congress On People’s Republic of China (PRC) Military Power, 
Department of Defense (DoD) Publications, Washington DC, 28 May 2004, 
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/d20040528PRC.pdf (accessed 8 May 05)  
52 “China's Secret Cape Canaveral A Sprawling City Of 15,000,” Space Daily, 2 Sep 04, 
http://www.spacedaily.com/news/china-04zze.html (accessed 19 May 05) 
53 David, Leonard, “Pentagon Report: China’s Space Warfare Tactics Aimed at U.S. Supremacy,” 
Space News, 1 Aug 03, http://www.space.com/news/china_dod_030801.html (accessed 8 May 05); For 
more discussion on Chinese ASAT development read Phillip Saunders, Jing-dong Yuan, Stephanie Lieggi, 
and Angela Deters, “China's Space Capabilities and the Strategic Logic of Anti-Satellite Weapons,” Center 
for Non-Proliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies (MIIS), Monterey, CA, 22 
Jul 02.  http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/week/020722.htm (accessed 29 May 05) 
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space systems can constitute a “disruptive” technology that represents an “emerging” 
threat to U.S. space superiority.54     
Phillip Saunders recognizes the potential that space can provide Beijing. 
Chinese space capabilities will improve in the coming decades, producing 
significant boosts in PLA military capabilities.55 
In addition, China may also attempt to disrupt U.S. space superiority. 
For countries that can never win a war with the United States by using the 
method of tanks and planes, attacking the US space system may be an 
irresistible and most tempting choice.56 
The convergence of the threat posed by China’s space modernization with the already 
high but still increasing dependence on space by the Pentagon creates a potentially useful 
target for dissuasion.57  The first section of this chapter introduces the reader to space 
operations, to include the advantages and limitations afforded by this medium, common 
space system functions, and the primary elements comprising a space system.  Then, this 
chapter explores the complications of defense policies that target space systems.  Finally, 
this chapter will discuss the various counter space means by which China might choose to 
attack American space systems.   
B. AN INTRODUCTION TO SPACE OPERATIONS 
“Gain the high ground,” an old concept that has served militaries well.  Whether it 
was Civil War commanders using balloons to spot enemy movements or the Cold War  
                                                 
54 2005 NDS, pp. 2-3 
55 Phillip Saunders, “China’s Future in Space: Implications for U.S. Security,” ad Astra, The Magazine 
of the National Space Society.  http://www.space.com/adastra/china_implications_0505.html (accessed 30 
May 05) 
56 Wang Hucheng, "The U.S. Military's 'Soft Ribs' and Strategic Weaknesses," Liaowang, Vol. 27, 
reprinted in Xinhua Hong Kong Service, July 5, 2000, FBIS CPP20000705000081 
57 The following three references provide a snapshot of the growth in U.S. military space dependence:  
“Operation DESERT STORM: Evaluation of the Air Campaign,” Letter Report, GAO/NSIAD-97-134, 12 
Jun 97; Mosley, Michael, “Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – By the Numbers,” USCENTAF Assessment 
and Analysis Division, 30 Apr 03; Rayermann, Patrick, “Exploiting Commercial SATCOM: A Better 
Way,” Parameters vol 33, no 4 (Winter 2003-04), 54-66 
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superpowers using satellites to survey opposing ICBM fields, the high ground affords 
capabilities not easily replaced by land or sea modes of operation.  As the highest ground, 
space has several advantages over other mediums of operation.   
1. Advantages 
First, space has persistent global access.  This means that borders, terrain, and in 
some cases weather that limit the access of air, land, and sea-based platforms to desired 
areas do not normally affect space access.  The ease by which satellites can move across 
territorial borders is especially significant since that is the primary limitation of 
traditional intelligence gathering platforms.  International law specifically describes 
territorial borders as not extending into space.58  Consequently, satellites can provide 
daily and global coverage to almost anywhere on the surface of the earth.  Second, space 
provides capabilities and services with very limited or essentially no forward basing, 
movement of troops and resources, and force protection.  In essence, a satellite launched 
from the U.S. can repeatedly see the world and transmit its findings without any 
personnel moving outside of U.S. borders.  Third, once placed in orbit, space systems are 
relatively inexpensive to maintain when compared to other mediums of operation.  
Granted the costs to launch satellites can reach over $1 billion, but once in orbit a handful 
of sparsely populated ground stations can keep these systems operating for as long as 10-
15 years.  When one compares this to what it would cost to continuously sustain enough 
U-2s capable of imaging the entire globe every day of every year the costs of sustaining 
space operations is considerably less. 
If a Taiwan Straits conflict erupted, these advantages would become vital to 
American military success.  With persistent and immediate global access, American 
forces would presumably have instantaneous C2, ISR, and missile warning services 
available to them before the conflict even begins.  The fact that the PLA could launch an 
extremely short notice barrage across the straits drives home the utility of this advantage.  
Furthermore, the fact that space systems provide services with little or no forward 
                                                 
58 “Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 
Including the Moon and other Celestial Bodies,” Office of Outer Space Affairs, United Nations,  Originally 
signed in Jan 67 and ratified as recently as Jan 03, http://www.oosa.unvienna.org/SpaceLaw/outerspt.html 
(accessed 8 May 05).  This treaty is commonly referred to as the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. 
 32
movement of troops or equipment bodes well in this scenario since few U.S. land bases 
exist within the Taiwan area of operations (AOR).  U.S. naval and air forces only need to 
turn on their systems to be able to utilize a number of many space services.  Lastly, the 
cost-effectiveness of space systems means that limited defense dollars can be used in 
other areas.  Moreover, many space systems can support multiple operations at the same 
time.  For example, America’s Defense Satellite Communications System (DSCS) has 
satellites in geostationary orbits (GEO) that can serve PACOM and CENTCOM 
requirements simultaneously.59  
2. Disadvantages 
However, like air, land, and sea operations, space also has inherent limitations.  
First, the location of space systems is rigid and movement from the original position in 
space is difficult.  The laws of orbital mechanics govern satellites and consequently they 
influence the location of space systems as well as the space systems loiter time over a 
given area.  For example, satellites in GEO remain relatively fixed over a given point on 
the earth, and from this location, most satellites can see one third of the earth, or in space 
vernacular the satellites “foot print” covers about one-third of the earth.  This 
phenomenon is what allows individuals to always point their satellite TV dishes in the 
same direction.  However, outside of very small adjustments to the geostationary 
position, orbital locations for these satellites do not move.  Figure 9 provides a snapshot 
of the various satellite orbits and the most common systems that populate those orbits. 
                                                 
59 “Survey of Space Weapons System Employment by the 50th Space Wing in Support of operation 
Iraqi Freedom,” 50th OSS/OSK, Schreiver AFB CO, 8 Oct 03, Section 5 
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Figure 9.   Satellite Orbits and Common Functions60 
 
Imagine if the media corporation DirectTV moved a satellite that was providing 
coverage to the central U.S. further east along the geosynchronous belt to provide more 
coverage of the eastern seaboard.  The results may benefit those on the East coast, but at 
the same time, this movement probably means that fewer subscribers on the West coast 
can continue to receive the satellite signal.  The consequences are the same for dedicated 
military systems.  If a commander in one theater, say EUCOM needs more satellite 
communications (SATCOM) bandwidth, the movement of one DSCS satellite may 
satisfy his needs, but it will likely have a reciprocal affect that reduces the bandwidth in a 
neighboring theater, like CENTCOM.  Granted these kinds of tradeoffs appear in all 
military conflicts, but it is still helpful for strategists to understand the cost of such 
decisions. 
                                                 
60 Ashton Carter, “Satellites and Anti-satellites: The Limits of the Possible,” International Security 
Vol. 10, No. 4 (Spring 1986), p. 49 
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Another factor affecting the feasibility of moving satellites is the extremely 
limited on-board fuel storage.  The introduction of the more efficient Hall-effect thrusters 
(HET) will help to mitigate this problem, but not on a sufficiently large scale to change 
the management principles of on-orbit space systems.61  Movement usually involves a 
tradeoff between meeting the demands of a crisis that lays outside the intended purpose 
of the space system and the overall life expectancy of the space system within its original 
design (since life expectancy directly relates to the amount of on-board fuel available for 
orbital station keeping). 
Similarly, designated orbital paths for satellites in low earth orbits (LEO) do not 
radically change.  Moreover, even though LEO orbits do not remain fixed over a given 
point but instead circle the earth approximately every 90 minutes, the feasibility of 
altering the original orbits is constrained.62  In addition to the fuel concerns that limit the 
movement of GEO satellites, another reason for lack of flexibility is that any movement 
of the satellite reduces the original coverage.  It is a give-and-take relationship and at 
times, it may be advantageous to move a satellite, but that is the exception and not the 
norm. 
Second, space systems are not as durable as other air, land, or sea platforms.  U-2 
aircraft took their first images 50 years ago and many of these same aircraft are still 
flying missions today.  By contrast, space systems usually only last for 10 to 15 years.  It 
is true that some satellites have been known to exceed their specified life expectancy, but 
not by 40 years.  In addition, the ability to repair space systems is negligible.  Ground 
station operators can resolve some anomalies, but essentially nothing can be done when 
problems require physical contact with the satellite.  Other air, land, and sea platforms 
have maintainers readily available to fix problems, or worst case the systems transition to 
a depot for extensive repairs.  Conversely, it is cost prohibitive to physically repair  
                                                 
61 Barry Watts, “The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment,” Center for Strategic and 
Budgetary Assessments (CSBA), Feb 01, p. 6.  Copies can be obtained through http://www.csbaonline.org/  
(accessed on 8 May 05). 
62 JP 3-14 Space Operations, p. F-4 
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satellites, whether through use of the space shuttle or some type of retrieval and re-launch 
process, space systems are not easily repaired.  Yet, even in light of these limitations, 
space systems still provide a wealth of functionality to numerous types of users. 
Many of these limitations will ultimately affect the manner in which the Pentagon 
executes a conflict with the PRC.  First, the space systems of operational value at the start 
of a conflict are most likely going to be the ones servicing American forces at the end of 
the conflict.  While other space systems may potentially offer additional services, the cost 
and time required to move them into a useful orbit is too high.  Second, the fragility of 
space systems, and the very limited number of spares means that the functions these 
systems provide can be quickly and in some cases easily cut off. 
3. Space Functions 
Space provides a number of useful functions to a variety of users.  In addition, it 
is not uncommon for a single space system such as satellite communication (SATCOM) 
systems to support multiple users.  SATCOM can be used by civilians to make phone 
calls, surf the internet, or watch television, or it can be used by the military to do those 
same things plus track logistical movements, issue orders up and down the chain of 
command, send electronic documents between units, or conduct a video teleconference 
(VTC) between combatant commander staffs.  Take for example the International 
Telecommunications Satellite Organization (IntelSat), an internationally owned 
consortium that leases SATCOM services across the globe to individuals, organizations, 
and states.63  The U.S. military uses IntelSat to broadcast its Armed Forces Radio and TV 
Services network, but IntelSat can chose to lease services simultaneously to China, Iran, 
and Russia for use by their respective militaries (reference Figure 10).  Therefore, several 
space functions are considered dual use.  However, SATCOM is only one of many 
functions provided by space. 
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 36
  
Figure 10.   IntelSat Asia Coverage64 
 
A commonly accepted grouping of space system functions (reference Table 2) is 
communications (SATCOM), navigation, remote sensing (i.e., imagery), weather, 
scientific, missile warning, and reconnaissance.  However, the specificity, sensitivity, and 
economic pay back of space-based reconnaissance-surveillance and missile warning 
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East, IntelSat, 2005, http://www.intelsat.com/resources/coveragemaps.aspx  (accessed on 8 May 05) 
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Communication X X 
Navigation X X 
Remote Sensing X X 
Weather X X 
Scientific X X 




    
There are some additional functions required for the employment of space 
systems, but they do not necessarily interact with space systems on a daily basis, nor are 
they required for day-to-day operations.  Nonetheless, space launch and space 
surveillance65 are two functions critical to the employment of space systems.66  Without 
these two capabilities, it would be impossible for space systems to exist.  Space launch is 
analogous to when a new ship gets underway for the first time.  Until the ship actually 
departs from the dock, it is not carrying out its mission.  Similarly, satellites cannot 
provide services while stuck on the ground.  In addition, space launch cannot take place 
until space surveillance uncovers the optimal trajectory to reach the designated orbit.  
Lack of space surveillance would be the same as aircraft flying around without air traffic 
controllers de-conflicting flight paths.  With nearly 10,000 “softball size or bigger”67 
objects orbiting the globe, and when very small particles can cause substantial damage 
(e.g., in 1983 a paint flake less than 1/100th of an inch in diameter put a crater in the 
shuttle Challenger’s windshield)68, it is vital to mission success that the paths satellites 
traverse remain clear of debris.   
 
                                                 
65 This space surveillance refers to the ground-based systems that track space objects (i.e., Earth 
systems tracking objects in space), which is different from the space-based surveillance systems in Table 2 
that track objects below the earth’s atmosphere (i.e., space systems tracking objects on or near earth). 
66 Michael Muolo, Space Handbook: A Warfighter’s Guide to Space, Vol I, AU-18, (Maxwell AFB, 
AL: Air University Press, Dec 93), pp. 22, 33, 39, 78, 85, 97-102, all of Ch. 4, and 142 
67 Barry Watts, “The Military Use of Space: A Diagnostic Assessment,” p. 78 
68 Jerry Sellers, Understanding Space: An Introduction to Astronautics, Second Edition  (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 2000), p. 70 
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4. Space System Elements 
 Space launch and space surveillance underscore the fact that space is much more 
than just satellites.  Most people can point to a tank, bomber, or submarine and 
understand the basic components of these older military systems as well as appreciate the 
traditional function these weapons fulfill.  Yet, in a number of ways space systems are 
different from other military platforms.  They are relatively unknown and 
indistinguishable when compared to more familiar weapon systems.  These differences 
and the unfamiliarity of space systems can cause problems when trying to develop a 
strategy that seeks to prevent a space arms race.  Therefore, understanding the elements 
of a space system can help U.S. leaders craft a more effective defense policy.  The U.S. 
DoD Joint Publications 3-14 Space Operations states that 
Space capabilities are based on complex systems that include the 
following: ground stations; launch facilities; satellite production, 
checkout, and storage facilities; communications links; user terminals; and 
spacecraft (both manned and unmanned).69 
The definition reveals that space systems consist of more than just satellites (i.e., space 
nodes), but also include the associated ground stations (i.e., terrestrial nodes) and 
communication signals (i.e., links) transiting between space and earth (reference Figure 
11).  
                                                 




Figure 11.   Space System Elements 
 
Understanding the elements of space systems is important because most threats to 
space systems are capable of targeting only one element.  Based on current technology, 
traditional weapons such as Tomahawk cruise missiles and precision guided munitions 
(PGM) released from aircraft represent the most likely choice to strike terrestrial nodes.  
This type of attack, also known as an offensive counter space (OCS) mission,70 took 
place during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) when coalition forces PGM pounded the 
Iraqi Ministry of Information in an effort to take down Iraq’s satellite broadcast 
capability.  Saddam’s use of GPS jammers against coalition forces in an attempt to 
degrade the PGM accuracy of coalition forces represents another type of OCS system, 
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albeit one that targets the space links element.71  Cuba’s July 2003 satellite jamming of 
the Voice of America broadcast to Iran is another type of ground-based system that 
targets the satellite links.72  Aside from the efforts of the U.S. and USSR during the Cold 
War, few states pursued counter space systems that targeted the space nodes.  However, 
in the wake of American military dominance, due in large part to enhanced lethality of 
other weapon systems arising from space operations, adversaries may undertake new 
efforts to develop counter space devices that due in fact target space nodes.  The recently 
released 2005 National Defense Strategy (NDS) considers this family of counter space 
systems to be an emerging threat to U.S. space superiority.73  Furthermore, potential foes 
like China are frantically pursuing space systems that support conventional military 
operations across the entire spectrum of known space functionality as depicted in Table 2. 
With an understanding of the functionality provided by space systems as well as 
the elements necessary to manage these services, it is easier to identify those areas more 
susceptible to enemy action and in turn, help U.S. decision makers target weapon systems 
for a dissuasive campaign.  In addition, some functions may prove more useful than 
others in specific operations.  For example, U.S. forces operating in Afghanistan are 
highly dependent on SATCOM to execute C2 and carry out assigned missions.  However, 
missile warning functions are not required against the remaining Taliban and Al Qaeda 
networks.  In the Taiwan Straits AOR, many space functions, and most certainly missile 
warning, will prove equally critical to the success of U.S. operations.  In addition, the 
ongoing modernization efforts by the PLA mean that they too are becoming dependent on 
key space functions, albeit on a much lower scale than U.S. dependency.   
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International Context, Dwight D. Eisenhower National Security Series, The Eisenhower Institute, 24 Feb 
04, http://www.eisenhowerseries.com/pdfs/final_04/US%20Space%20Operations%20-%20EI-
%20ENSS%20Final.pdf (accessed 8 May 05) 
72 “U.S. Accuses Cuba of Jamming Broadcasts to Iran,” Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), PBS On-
Line News Hour, 17 Jul 03, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/media/media_watch/july-dec03/jamming_07-
17.html (accessed on 8 May 05) and Stephan Johnson, “Cuban Jamming Demands a Firm Response,”  The 
Heritage Foundation Web Memo #319, 22 Jul 03, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/LatinAmerica/wm319.cfm (accessed 6 Jun 05) 
73 2005 NDS 
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C. COMPLICATIONS OF DISSUADING SPACE SYSTEMS 
Several factors will complicate a U.S. defense policy of dissuasion that aims to 
reduce the threat of space systems.  First, China’s space program already has operational 
systems providing a wide range of military and commercial capabilities.74  China’s space 
capabilities give it more than just a foot-in-the-door.  In fact, China is already reaping the 
numerous benefits afforded by the highest frontier.  In addition, even though China’s 
space programs are relatively immature when compared to the U.S., the learning curve 
for improving upon these technologies is steep.  Finally, it is one thing to dissuade 
someone from doing something they cannot already do and hence cannot appreciate its 
advantages; it is an entirely different thing to dissuade someone from doing something 
they already do, especially when it has clear benefits.   
Second, there is an extremely close relationship between military and commercial 
entities in the space industry.  Some systems are dual use such as navigational or weather 
satellites.  Therefore, targeting programs that provide many services enjoyed by the 
public is challenging to carry out.  For example, it would be difficult to justify the denial 
of satellite produced weather information used to aid civilian populations.  A properly 
networked space-based weather information structure may have reduced the devastation 
caused by the recent Indian Ocean tsunamis as well as other types of catastrophic events. 
Third, states frequently buy space capabilities from other states or commercial 
businesses.  For example, France and Russia both operate military space systems and it is 
widely believed that both of these states offer their military space systems for use by 
other countries.75  In addition, several commercial companies sell space services to 
include imaging and satellite communications.76  This limits the prospect of a dissuasion 
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policy because even if China abandons certain space programs, they may still acquire 
similar information through these third party connections. 
In light of these reasons, it seems unlikely that dissuasion will succeed in stopping 
China from pursuing many types of military space systems.  In addition, many of these 
space systems (e.g., commercial communications satellites) simply do not pose a 
significant enough threat to U.S. security interests to justify a dissuasion campaign.  
However, space weapon systems that can destroy other satellites (e.g., space mines) or 
from space can destroy things on earth (e.g., space-based laser) do in fact present a 
significant threat to not only U.S. space supremacy, but to U.S. security as well.  It is for 
these reasons that a dissuasion campaign should only target counter space systems. 
D. COUNTER SPACE SYSTEMS 
Counter space systems can be broken down into two categories:  offensive 
counter space (OCS) and defensive counter space (DCS). 
OCS operations preclude an adversary from exploiting space to their 
advantage.  OCS operations may target an adversary’s space capability 
(space systems, terrestrial systems, links, or third party space capability), 
using a variety of permanent and/or reversible means.  The “Five Ds” —
deception, disruption, denial, degradation, and destruction—describe the 
range of desired effects when targeting an adversary’s space systems.77 
The 1997 Iranian jamming of Western satellite broadcasts and the 1999 Russian 
disruption of Chechen satellite phone calls and are two examples of OCS activities.78  
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DCS operations preserve US/friendly ability to exploit space to its 
advantage via active and passive actions to protect friendly space-related 
capabilities from enemy attack or interference.  Friendly space-related 
capabilities include space systems such as satellites, terrestrial systems 
such as ground stations, and communication links.  DCS operations are 
key to enabling continued exploitation of space by the US and its allies by 
protecting, preserving, recovering, and reconstituting friendly space-
related capabilities before, during, and after an adversary attack.79 
In certain instances, a single action can take on OCS and DCS characteristics 
simultaneously.  For example, a well placed Tomahawk missile on a SATCOM jammer 
located in Cuba is both an OCS and DCS mission.  From an OCS perspective, the attack 
destroys an adversary’s space system.  However, from a DCS perspective the attack 
protects U.S. space operations from the hostile actions of the jammer.   
Similar to a fighter aircraft’s ability to dispense chaff and flares and produce 
threat reaction maneuvers in response to surface to air missiles (SAM), space systems 
must also be able to defend against hostile acts.  DCS consists of various measures aimed 
at defeating an adversary’s attack.  These measures consist of such tactics as system 
hardening, dispersal, maneuvering, system configuration changes, and suppression of 
adversary counterspace capabilities (SACC).80  Unfortunately, these current measures 
provide no realistic defense against anti satellite lasers, parasitic micro satellites, and 
advanced computer network attacks.  While some satellites, like an imaging system, may 
be able to automatically place a protective cap over the system’s lenses, it cannot stop an 
anti-satellite weapon from physically destroying the entire satellite bus.  In addition, 
while satellite movement is theoretically feasible, this movement in relation to the 
potential threats is too slow to prevent an attack.81  Therefore, the U.S. is attempting to 
take meaningful steps to improve DCS capabilities. 
                                                 
79 “Ministry Spokesman Admits Phone Jamming in N. Caucasus,” Paris AFP (North European 
Service), 24 Nov 99, FBIS AU2411101599; “Mullah’s Terrorism Targets Satellite Communication,” 
National Council of Resistance of Iran – Paris, 12 Aug 97, http://www.iran-e-
azad.org/english/ncr/970812.html (accessed 8 May 05) 
80 AFDD 2-2.1 Counterspace Operations, pp. 26-27 
81 Singer, Jeremy, “STRATCOM Chief says need for Space Control is Now,” Space News, 30 Mar 04, 
http://www.space.com/news/nss_stratcom_040330.html (accessed 8 May 05) 
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Improving DCS system capability may allow for the shielding of critical 
components from potentially destructive forces.  For example, the newest GPS Block III 
satellites in production house more robust DCS capabilities than previous versions.  
These capabilities enable the satellite to withstand multiple levels of denial, disruption, 
and degradation attacks.82  The Air Force’s Military Strategic and Tactical Relay 
(MILSTAR) satellite constellation represents another example of improved DCS 
capabilities.  This system is designed to reduce the impacts of nuclear explosions on 
SATCOM signals as well as on the satellite itself.  Moreover, MILSTAR utilizes cross-
links between satellites thereby reducing, although not eliminating, the requirement for 
terrestrial ground station support.83  However, since U.S. territory is no longer considered 
unassailable ground station physical security is also being strengthened through improved 
force protection measures.  Moreover, new space systems will have abilities to threat 
react in a more tactical nature.  Again, similar to air operations where pilots use on-board 
sensors such as radar warning receivers (RWR) gear to make real time defensive 
maneuvering decisions, so too will space operators for the systems they command.  
Nonetheless, while the U.S. has taken some steps to upgrade its DCS capability, space 
systems remain highly vulnerable to attack. 
In addition to OCS and DCS categories, counter space systems can also be 
separated into space-based and ground-based.  Space-based OCS systems include mines, 
lasers, and any other types of space-based platforms designed to deny, degrade, disrupt, 
deceive, or destroy.  Interestingly, no state employs or has ever employed space-based 
OCS systems.  The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) put forth by President Regan in 
1983 had the capacity to disrupt other space systems, although that was not the primary 
mission of this program.  Furthermore, this system never progressed beyond the initial 
stages of research.  Conversely, the Soviets and Americans did develop and test ground-
                                                 
82 NAVSTAR GPS Block III Specs, Andrews Technical Service, 14 Apr 03, 
http://www.spaceandtech.com/spacedata/constellations/navstar-gps-block3_conspecs.shtml (accessed 8 
May 05) 
83 Boeing Satellite Systems Fact Sheets, MILSTAR II, 2004, http://www.boeing.com/defense-
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 45
based OCS systems.  Specifically, each country explored the utility of an anti-satellite 
(ASAT) missile.     
The Soviets first ASAT used an ICBM fitted with an explosive device that 
released 1,000s of small pellets once it approached its intended satellite target.  In 
addition, the Soviet nuclear-armed Galosh ABM interceptor could fulfill the role of 
ASAT weapon against satellites in specific low earth orbits (LEO).  The Americans also 
investigated a crude ASAT system in the late 1960s but eventually abandoned it in favor 
of an F-15 launched ASAT system that lingered in existence until the mid-1980s.84  
During this time, the development of ASAT systems may have seemed like simply a 
natural evolution of space operations.  Much like other mediums of operation, it was only 
a matter of time before the necessity arose to destroy and therefore protect space-based 
systems.  Interestingly though, space systems did not follow this path and ASAT 
technology never did produce a true military arms race in space.  In fact, to this day space 
has remained relatively free of weapons.   
One reason why ASAT development did not endear itself to superpower 
leadership was the potential destabilizing affect it would cause on the tenuous nuclear 
arms race.  ASAT systems that destroyed the adversary’s missile warning or 
communications systems may mean that the aggressor is considering a first strike.  ASAT 
systems that target remote sensing platforms may imply that one side is either trying to 
covertly change its nuclear order of battle, by moving systems around or fueling up new 
systems.  In either case, ASAT systems constituted a precursor to a first strike, which 
might cause a destabilizing influence on the already tricky Cold War.  Therefore, the 
presence and affect of ASAT systems during the Cold War was short lived and of small 
impact.  In addition, the demise of the ASAT re-enforced the notion that space systems 
best served a critical but nonetheless supporting role to other means of warfare and 
security.  President Johnson highlighted the capability and value of the supporting role 
played by these early space programs. 
 
                                                 
84 Joseph Nye and James Schear, Seeking Stability in Space:  Anti-Satellite Weapons and the Evolving 
Space Regime.  (Lanham, Maryland:  University Press, Inc., 1987), pp. 7-8 
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I wouldn’t want to be quoted on this but we’ve spent 35 or 40 billion 
dollars on the space program.  And if nothing else had come out of it 
except the knowledge we’ve gained from space photography, it would be 
worth 10 times what the whole program cost.  Because tonight we know 
how many missiles the enemy has and, it turned out, our guesses were way 
off.  We were doing things we didn’t need to do.  We were building things 
we didn’t need to build.  We were harboring fears we didn’t need to 
harbor.  Because of satellites, I know how many missiles the enemy has.85 
 Johnson’s comments re-enforce the notion that the U.S. is highly dependent upon 
space capabilities.  Therefore, it makes sense that current as well as potential adversaries 
would seek to develop other, more acceptable counter space technologies.  The GPS 
jammers used by Saddam’s forces during Iraqi Freedom and the SATCOM jammer used 
by Cuba to negate the Voice of America broadcast (i.e., both are OCS systems that target 
the links element of space systems) represent a lucrative area for growth in counter space 
systems.  First, they are cheap and relatively easy to build.  Second, they have proven 
capabilities, especially the SATCOM jammer used against Voice of America.  Third, 
they avoid the current dilemma of weaponizing space, although it certainly offers a 
slippery slope in that direction.  Fourth, while it is possible that these systems could 
target missile-warning systems, they are unlikely to foster the levels of instability created 
by the Cold War ASAT systems.  Finally, they offer the potential of disrupting a key area 
of U.S. military dominance and subsequently reducing the overall combat effectiveness 
of American forces. 
 Another potential counter space system that offers equally appealing affects is 
lasers that could target space nodes, links, and possibly even terrestrial nodes.  However, 
several differences exist between lasers and jammers.  One difference is that jammers are 
a more proven commodity and in some cases have worked remarkably well in actual 
employment.  In addition, various forms of electronic jamming have been taking place 
for decades.  For example, the U.S. military used a variety of airborne jammers during 
the initial stages of Desert Storm to help confuse the enemy.  Conversely, laser 
                                                 
85 Dwayne Day, John Logsdon, Brian Latell, Eye in the Sky: The Story of the CORONA Spy Satellites.  
(Washington DC:  Smithsonian Institute Press, 1998), p. 1 
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technology as a space weapon is still confined to research and development, and seems to 
be a longs way from actual operational status, not to mention doctrinally proven and 
integrated into other operations.  For many of these same reasons, space mines are 
unlikely to reach operational status in the near future.  In sum, with respect to space-
based counter space systems, many problems exist.   
 Since there is considerable momentum to keep space free of weapons that the 
most likely course available to China to attack U.S. space superiority is through ground-
based counter space technologies.  These systems offer sufficient capability to 
successfully target and engage U.S. space platforms.  
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E. SUMMARY 
Deng Xiaoping’s harsh criticism of the PLA in 1979 sparked numerous efforts by 
the PRC to modernize its military to meet the demands of national security.  In the 
decades that have followed, new Chinese leadership pressed for continued steps to update 
a severely archaic military, especially in light of the amazing successes of U.S. forces 
during this time.  Today, PLA modernization efforts continue with modest results in 
various areas to include space operations.  As one of three states to send a man into space 
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and one of seven states capable of launching satellites, China is making progress to 
harness the power of this new medium.  
And why not?  Space provides a wealth of capabilities across a number of 
important functions, which would prove beneficial to both the Beijing and Washington in 
a Taiwan Straits conflict.  However, the multiple elements necessary to operate space 
systems make them more vulnerable than other, more traditional weapon systems.  Of 
immediate concern is the fact that the links element of space systems is particularly 
susceptible to jamming.  Therefore, while space operations are critical, they are also 
vulnerable, and while U.S. forces are highly dependent upon these systems, they are not 
well protected nor easily replaced.  Nonetheless, space systems are a key component to 
any plan the U.S. as well as PRC might execute in the Taiwan Straits. 
However, numerous factors constrain the applicability of a dissuasion policy that 
seeks to reduce the emergence of Chinese space capabilities.  Many space systems are 
dual use in nature and therefore difficult to target with this policy.  Furthermore, some 
space systems simply do not pose a threat to U.S. space superiority or the type of 
information provided by them can be obtained through another state or via commercial 
industries.  Consequently, the area most likely to offer a useful target for dissuasion is 
counter space systems. 
Counter space systems, primarily OCS, are still an emerging threat that do not 
support civilian needs or currently exist in an established role in PLA operations.  
Therefore, these types of space systems provide U.S. policy makers with an ideal target 
for a dissuasive strategy. 
In all conflicts, opposing sides strive to find a weak spot to exploit.  One weak 
spot in the U.S. military arsenal is space systems.  These platforms provide a host of 
capabilities not easily replaced.  Compounding this problem is the fact that most of these 
systems have essentially no defensive mechanisms to fend off possible attacks.  
Furthermore, the communication links, the means by which space systems receive and 
deliver information, has proven to be especially easy prey using relatively primitive 
techniques, as recently demonstrated by Russia, Iran, and Cuba.  Ground-based space 
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jammers represent one of several possible counter space systems likely to be developed 
by the PLA and ultimately employed against the U.S. military in a future conflict.  It 
behooves U.S. strategists to ponder the dynamics of space operations and the manner by 
which U.S. forces as well as Chinese forces utilize these systems.  The proper analysis of 
the PLA and its use of counter space systems will enable American leaders to ascertain if 
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IV. CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS 
A. BACKGROUND 
All other things being equal, it is usually safe to assume that decision makers look 
at situations and make decisions based on a cost-benefit analysis.  “Will this decision and 
the resultant course of action it sets us on as well as the counter actions taken by others 
garner me more than it costs?”  However, in some cases, the decisions are less about 
achieving success than about avoiding failure.  In other words, some instances require 
decision makers to accept a limited amount of loss to avoid even greater losses in the 
future.  For example, it may be costly to leave U.S. space systems defenseless, especially 
given the enhancements space endows upon the greater American military machine.  
However, the costs may be even higher if U.S. leaders choose to truly weaponize space 
since other states would be compelled to produce comparable space weapons to keep 
pace with Washington’s military build up.  Nonetheless, the conditions for success 
usually exist when the benefits of a specific course of action outweigh the costs.  This 
chapter focuses on establishing the conditions necessary for a policy of dissuasion that 
targets Chinese OCS systems to succeed.  
Defining the conditions for successful dissuasion is challenging because no 
historical record exists that describes its application and subsequent consequences.  
Nonetheless, the 1983 proposal for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) may offer a 
snapshot into the types of conditions necessary for dissuasion.  The theoretical utility of 
SDI was formidable and if proven capable of actual operations it may have seriously 
jolted the nuclear stability of this time.  In addition, the nature of this system would 
profoundly affect the manner by which the U.S. could execute future conventional 
missions.  With assured access to space for the U.S. and its allies combined with assured 
denial of space to the USSR and its allies, the potential capabilities and political 
ramifications of this system were powerful.  Therefore, SDI represented to its proponents 
a system that would diminish a key foundation of the USSR military forces, the ICBM. 
Furthermore, the economic costs for the USSR to match SDI were simply 
insurmountable, although the costs to defeat the system were likely to be much less.  
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Already in a tailspin from the apparent economic boom of the late 1960s and early 1970s, 
the USSR could not afford to precede step-for-step with the U.S. SDI efforts.  Moreover, 
the diplomatic conditions present during this time supported the U.S. decision to pursue 
SDI.  Even though the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty was still in effect and 
numerous groups opposed weaponizing space, the idea that SDI could topple the USSR 
and therefore help bring about an end to the Cold War overwhelmed these other issues 
and convinced President Reagan among others that this system housed strong utility. 
As mentioned in Chapter II, the concept of dissuasion as a U.S. defense policy 
arose from several factors, one of which was the necessity of a policy that offsets the 
limitations and dangerous consequences of deterrence and assurance.  Unfortunately, 
merely transposing the conditions for deterrence or assurance success does not do justice 
to the fact that dissuasion is an entirely new strategy with its own characteristics.  
Therefore, any attempt to define the conditions necessary for this defense policy to 
succeed will involve a great deal of speculation.  In addition, while U.S. strategists can 
analyze data in an attempt to predict the future course of military procurement (i.e., 
dissuasion seeks to avoid arms races), no one is entirely sure how it will actually unfold.  
Furthermore, while several types of counter space systems were discussed in Chapter III, 
these were all based on journalistic references.  The secretive nature of military weapons 
procurement leads to a less than an exact accounting of actual OCS systems.  
Nonetheless, even given these constraints, theorists can make certain logical arguments 
that define conditions when dissuasion is most likely to be successful.   
This thesis proposes that dissuasion’s best chance for success is when China 
confronts the following conditions: 
• Militarily it cannot employ effective offensive counter space weapons 
• Economically the cost of developing these systems is simply too high 
• Diplomatically the instability caused by developing such devices 
outweighs the benefits enjoyed by stable diplomatic relations with the U.S. 
and others.   
 This chapter explores each of these conditions individually, although establishing 
the military conditions is the primary endeavor given the tactical nature of this specific 
dissuasion policy.  More strategic level dissuasion policies will involve correspondingly 
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more emphasis on the diplomatic conditions.  Regardless, no conditions can be 
discounted, but must be analyzed within the overall context of the intended objective.   
B. MILITARY CONDITION 
1. Criterion #1 – Only Target Non-Operational or Emerging Systems 
China already possesses the capability to build, launch, and operate space 
systems.  In fact, recent modernizations efforts have sought to propel China’s space 
program into a more Western-style infrastructure.  The Commission of Science, 
Technology, and Industry directs the civil and military space programs, which is akin to 
the Office of Science and Technology in the U.S. Whitehouse.  In addition, portions of 
the civil space programs fall under the China Aerospace Corporation and the China 
National Space Administration, which loosely corresponds to the National Aeronautical 
and Space Administration (NASA) in the U.S.86   
From a space launch perspective, China has a solid history of successes.  
Currently, only a handful of states or organizations (U.S., Russia, China, European Space 
Agency (ESA), India, Israel, and Japan) possess space launch capacity.  China’s 
inventory of space launch systems is substantial, and as of 2003, they had launched 73 
satellites.87  China’s Long March series of rockets (12 different versions) possesses the 
capability to place satellites into low earth orbit (LEO) and geostationary orbits (GEO).  
China is looking to increase its heavy lift capacity to a gaudy 25 tons for LEO and 14 
tons for GEO.  These numbers compare favorably to the European Space Agency (ESA) 
and the U.S.’s space lift fleet.88  As a reference point, consider that the Long March 
rockets could easily lift two of the larger U.S. defense satellites on orbit (e.g., Defense 
Support Program (DSP) satellites weigh less than 3 tons at 5,250 lbs and the Military 
Strategic and Tactical Relay (MILSTAR) satellites weigh 5 tons at 10,000 lbs).  
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Furthermore, the ability to carry more weight may indicate that China seeks to place 
multiple satellites in orbit with one launcher.  This is a modern space launch tactic and 
was used regularly during the implementation of the launching of the Iridium 
constellation in the late 1990s.   
China carries out its space launch activities at three locations.  Jiuquan serves as 
the manned space flight launch site, Taiyuan is used for LEO launches, and Xichang is 
the primary launch pad for GEO satellites.89  Collectively, the ability to launch into the 
two most popular and meaningful orbits (LEO and GEO) and the high success rate of 
Chinese space launches has contributed to making China’s space launch industry not only 
highly regarded and prestigious within China, but also attractive to foreign commercial 
vendors and state governments.  Consequently, China has successfully launched 27 
foreign owned satellites.90  China is also actively engaged in multilateral space system 
development.  For example, China developed a new SATCOM system, the DFH-3 series, 
in a joint venture with Germany,91 on October 21, 2003, China launched an “advanced 
multi-spectral remote sensing spacecraft developed in conjunction with Brazil,”92 and in 
2006, China will launch a Nigerian satellite that it was also contracted to build.93  
However, even though China has made significant progress in its efforts to modernize, 
including its achievements in space, according to the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) 
it is still decades behind the U.S.   
China is far from becoming a global military power and it remains at least 
two decades behind the US in military technology and ability.94 
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Council on Foreign Relations Maurice R. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies,” Council on Foreign 
Relations (CFR), 2003, p. 2, http://www.cfr.org/pdf/China_TF.pdf (accessed 11 May 05) 
 55
In sum, the PRC already possesses the ability to build, launch, and operate space systems.  
Moreover, they not only recognize the benefits that space provides, they actively harness 
these benefits and integrate them into normal operations.  In addition, even though 
China’s overall space program is “decades behind” U.S. space capabilities, it is 
nonetheless an existing threat and not merely a non-operational emerging industry. 
2. Criterion #2 – Only Target OCS Systems 
Another aspect to consider concerning China’s current space program is that as 
each year passes the services provided by these systems become further embedded within 
normalized Beijing operations.  Consequently, the Chinese have developed a dependency 
on these systems that would be difficult to replace.  To try to dissuade Chinese leaders to 
abandon existing commercial and military space programs does not seem realistic.  In 
addition, the often times dual commercial – military nature of space systems makes them 
appear hazy in any strategy’s targeting scope.  This situation forces U.S. strategists to 
narrow the dissuasive strategy to space systems serving only military functions as well as 
systems that are non-operational (i.e., emerging).  The emerging systems that most 
closely resemble these criteria are anti-satellite missiles, lasers, directed energy, and 
satellite links jammers type weapons platforms (reference Table 1).  Many of these OCS 
systems are in the research and development phase and seek to provide traditional 
military destructive capability.  Also, they are still relatively unknown or not in use.  
Consequently, China does not operate these systems or currently enjoy their benefits.  
Therefore, dissuasion, a strategy specifically designed to deal with emerging threats, is 
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In addition, by targeting weaponized systems the U.S. can potentially tap into the 
large “no weapons in space” bandwagon that currently exists.  Since a number of 
international treaties currently ban weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in space, which 
by itself is a very elusive definition and since the U.S. military greatly fears the 
possibility of space weapons increasing the already debris-riddled atmosphere, a 
dissuasive campaign against these types of systems already has the momentum and 
leverage of existing policies and interests.99  However, the impetus to keep space 
“weapons free” really only applies to space-based OCS systems such a space-based laser 
or a space-based ABM system and to destructive OCS systems like a kinetic ASAT or 
space mine that would create a debris cloud in space.  Other OCS systems that execute 
their missions through temporary or reversible means lay within a gray area that so far 
seems to be more acceptable to the international community.  If the Russian attack on 
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99 “United Nations Treaties and Principles on Space Law,” Office for Outerspace Affairs, United 
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Chechen cell phones or the Cuban attack on the Voice of America were carried out 
through a destructive OCS platform like a kinetic ASAT that permanently eliminated a 
space-based SATCOM system, then these events would not have been as easily forgotten.   
Unfortunately, by targeting these types of systems it would be difficult for the 
Pentagon to justify the pursuit of similar OCS systems for its own use.  If the Washington 
does choose to pursue these systems but still engage in dissuasion against them for others 
such as Beijing, then it becomes problematic to use public support and international law 
as a strategy springboard.  Furthermore, international law and concerns over space debris 
do not apply to the OCS ground-based satellite links jammers that have emerged in recent 
years. 
Another characteristic of this criterion is that it re-enforces the notion that 
dissuasion aims to target emerging threats, not existing or engaging threats (reference 
Figure 2 and Table 1 in Chapter II).  Of course, there is a hazy line between emerging and 
existing threats.  It is likely that American policy makers might still consider jammers to 
be an emerging threat due to the relatively crude and experimental nature of the few 
existing devices, the less than sophisticated employment tactics, the rudimentary 
doctrine, and the lack of integration into other military operations.  Subsequently, this 
criterion then avoids depriving China of a system that they currently depend upon as well 
as targeting something used by civilians.  Another advantage is that this criterion aims to 
reduce the same military space weapons that many international and state organizations 
seek to abolish.  Finally, the probability that China is already developing OCS weapons 
means that U.S. policy makers have an actual emerging threat to dissuade. 
3. Criterion #3 – U.S. Systems Are Unassailable, Easily Replenished, or 
Substitute Sources of Similar Capability Exist 
The last criterion of the military condition is that the U.S. possesses better 
defensive space measures than China’s offensive space weapons.  This criterion is 
slightly different in format from the previous ones.  It is comprised of three alternatives, 
but only one needs to be present for the criterion to function.  One option of this criterion 
is that the unassailable nature of U.S. systems would present such an insurmountable 
dilemma to the Chinese that they would have no logical alternatives but to abandon any 
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attempts to develop offensive space weapons.  However, this option requires the ability to 
completely protect all the elements of a given space system (terrestrial nodes, links, and 
space nodes - Reference Figure 11, Chapter III) through defensive counterspace (DCS) 
tactics.  Highly effective defensive measures could possibly consist of on-board 
mechanisms that could either maneuver the satellite away from the threat, destroy the 
threat as it approaches, or harden key components and sensors on-board the spacecraft. 
100   
Satellite ground stations that provide satellite command and control, filter and 
interpret satellite-derived information, and use satellite-based knowledge to support the 
efforts of other entities would also need to be unassailable since their destruction 
produces the same effect of rendering the space system unusable.  Even with the on-
going efforts of the Department of Homeland Security to include the establishment of 
U.S. Northern Command, many terrestrial nodes inside and outside the U.S. are not 
protected well enough to stop a debilitating attack.  Finally, and possibly most 
importantly, the links connecting terrestrial ground stations with orbiting space nodes 
would need to be secure from jamming, interference, and spoofing.  
 























The concept of replenishment is another option for this criterion.  This option 
entails the U.S. replenishing space systems faster than the destruction caused by Chinese 
space weapons.  China would have to ask itself, “Why attack U.S. space systems if the 
systems will in effect be rapidly replaced in such a way that U.S. capabilities remain 
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intact?”  Unfortunately, this option requires two nearly unachievable capabilities for the 
U.S.  One is the ability to rapidly launch multiple spare satellites within minutes of 
destruction and quickly make them operational, and the other is having the necessary 
spare satellites ready and loaded on spacelift vehicles.  Even with the advent of the 
newest launch vehicles, spacelift processing times will still take months, not the minutes 
required for unassailability.102  Moreover, the high cost of satellites, sometimes as much 
as $1 billion makes spare satellite inventory financially unacceptable.   
However, the availability of substitute sources to space systems may provide 
another avenue to achieving this criterion.  If the U.S. can produce sufficient air, land, 
and sea-based platforms to compensate for attacks on space-based platforms then that 
would contribute to dissuading a potential adversary.  For example, sufficient air-based 
ISR platforms may allow U.S. planners to compensate for the loss of space-based ISR 
systems.  Unfortunately, there are certain inaccessible regions that air, land, or sea-based 
ISR sensors simply cannot reach such as Moscow, Tehran, and Beijing.  These deeply 
land-locked and highly important cities offer no viewable access to U.S. air, land, and 
sea-based sensors.  In sum, the requirements for military criterion #3 are unlikely to be 
achieved since the U.S. does not have the capability to make space systems immune from 
destruction, easily and quickly replenished, or able to be compensated for by other air, 
land, and sea systems. 
C. ECONOMIC CONDITION 
From an economic standpoint, dissuasion is most likely to be successful if 
China’s financial resources are extremely limited whereas U.S. resources are relatively 
abundant.  The concept behind this condition is that if China cannot afford to keep pace 
with American weapons procurement, and more specifically with respect to OCS and 
DCS space technologies, than they will be unable to field systems capable of defeating 
U.S. weapon systems and hence will consciously decide not to engage in an arms race.  
This condition requires a highly robust U.S. economy that could afford to take full 
advantage of the technological space capabilities that exist.  Simultaneously, China 
would need to be mired in a sluggish and extremely limited economy that is forced to 
                                                 
102 AFDD 2-2 Space Operations, p. 34 
 60
manage very constrained defense spending options even more than they currently do.  
Consequently, the large gap in finances creates an economic condition where the U.S. is 
able to invest in the superior defensive space capabilities that would ward off any 
conceivable OCS system introduced by the Chinese.   
1. Criterion #1 – Basic Economic Strength 
At $10.5 trillion, the U.S. economy is nearly twice that of China, which boasts the 
second highest GDP at almost $6 trillion.103  However, is it strong enough that China is 
dissuaded from developing space weapon systems?  Does this gap in revenue cause PRC 
leaders to pause at every decision and analyze the cost-benefit relationship?  Surely, all 
leaders make such assessments regardless of the economic gap.  However, what the 
economic condition is trying to define is whether the financial gap is large enough that 
PRC leaders not only pause, but also recognize the impossibility of overcoming the gap.  
Unfortunately, every year China closes the financial gap that exists between them and the 
U.S.  China’s real rate of growth has outpaced the U.S. growth by nearly a 4-to-1 margin 
over the last few years.104  Moreover, with the Pentagon scrambling to make ends meet 
due to the incredible drain on military budgets stemming from ongoing operations in 
Afghanistan and more significantly Iraq, its seems unlikely that U.S. decision makers will 
see a windfall of funds to dole out to DCS systems when the threat from OCS systems is 
arguably weak. 
Comparing China’s budget with respect to its regional interests sheds some light 
on not only its position compared to the U.S., but also with respect to its regional 
competitors.  China’s $56 billion defense bill in 2002 is 40% more than Japan and 800% 
more than Taiwan’s.  This is due in large part to the 300% increase in defense spending 
that occurred between 1996 and 2004.105  However, military spending per capita flips this 
relationship upside down (reference Table 3).  As the most populous country in the 
world, this data seems logical.  Additional statistical computations exist that support the 
                                                 
103 World Fact Book, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1 Jan 04, 
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notion that China’s forces are getting increasingly more money each year.  However, 
other statistics support the notion that from a relative standpoint of per capita or as a 
percentage of GDP, Chinese defense spending is low.   
 
Table 6.  East Asia Military Expenditures per Capita106 
1. Taiwan $335.08 per person 
2. Japan $310.65 per person  
3. Korea, South $271.16 per person  
4. Korea, North $232.23 per person  
5. China $43.44 per person  
Unlike during the climactic years of the Cold War where U.S. strategists could 
spend at will and in turn support the collapse of the Soviet economy, the Sino-American 
economic relationship is much different.  During the 1980s, Moscow’s command driven 
economy was plummeting while Washington’s market economy was soaring.  Today, 
Beijing’s market-based economy is soaring faster than the U.S. economy, and it is highly 
unlikely that U.S. strategists in this era have the freedom to spend at will.  
2. Criterion #2 – Modern Military Industrial Complex 
Current U.S. naval capabilities offer an example of this criterion.  The substantial 
industrial tail that goes along with the sizable U.S. naval fleet would be difficult for 
another country to imitate.  The amount of finances required to build 12 aircraft carriers, 
associated support vessels, docking facilities, logistical supplies, capable seamen, as well 
as executable doctrine and training is well beyond anything that China or any other 
country in the world could afford.  In essence, the gap between the U.S. navy and other 
navies is so wide that states are dissuaded from pursuing a large capital fleet because of 
the economic costs associated with such a venture is just too high, relative to the strategic 
advantages it would afford.  Japan and Germany both attempted to pursue a navy that was 
beyond their means in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and both failed at 
sustaining it.  A host of arguments can be made that explain this failure and some even 
argue that it had less to do with economics and more to do with the long-standing 
                                                 
106 Nation Master, Military Expenditures 
 62
interests of these states.  Regardless of exactly how much economics was a factor, 
whether it was the most important or simply one of many, it was nonetheless a factor in 
these failures.   
In certain instances, U.S. policy makers actually construct international 
relationships that encourage states NOT to pursue naval build-up.  These policy makers 
offer up U.S. naval services with specific caveats that compel states not to undertake a 
military buildup in exchange for U.S. protection.  In these cases, the arrangement benefits 
both states.  The U.S. may garner basing rights while the smaller state saves money and 
gains protection.  While not as demanding as sustaining a modern navy, nurturing a 
modern space program carries many of the same requirements. 
However, one needs look no further than China’s national defense infrastructure 
(i.e., military-industrial complex) to witness repeated failures to establish modern 
industries and practices.  David Shambaugh notes this problem in his book Modernizing 
China’s Military. 
China’s persistent search abroad for military technology and hardware has 
been born of necessity and is a clear indication of indigenous failure: 
China’s own industries, scientists, and technicians have consistently failed 
to keep pace with either their nation’s defensive needs or global 
standards.107 
So, does China possess the type of military-industrial complex necessary to sustain its 
security endeavors?  Specifically, does it at least possess enough of an industry to sustain 
capable OCS systems?  The former is more difficult to answer, but certainly, the answer 
to the latter is “Yes.”  As discussed in Chapter III, OCS systems need not consist of 
space-based platforms with highly sophisticated capabilities.  Crude ground-based 
jammers have already proved sufficient to negate advanced command and control 
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3. Criterion #3 – Diversification of Interests 
Another key component of an economic analysis between China and the U.S. is a 
comparison of each state’s security interests.  Figures 1 and 2 provide a snapshot of how 
each state military is set up to handle the security of interests.  Compared against the U.S. 
breakdown for military regions it is evident that the Chinese only need to expend 
resources to defend its existing continental territory.  The only exception, although a 
significant one nonetheless, to this situation is Taiwan, where the PLA is investing 
resources to develop a legitimate amphibious assault force.  In contrast, notice the spread 
of U.S. regions across every square inch of the globe and includes bases, ports, and 
liaisons in many countries and on every continent.  The economic consequences of this 
vast military diversification are the necessity to spread out defense dollars across these 
regions.  Furthermore, the U.S. must develop and sustain the capability to transport forces 
rapidly to and from each region.  Conversely, the logistical cost to Beijing is considerably 
less than it is for Washington.   
This translates into a similar relationship for space system expenditures, where 
China only needs to support enough space systems to enhance regional operations 
whereas the U.S. must maintain enough systems to simultaneously support multiple 
regions for a continuous global presence.  
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Figure 12.   China’s Military Regions 
 
 
Figure 13.   U.S. Military Regions 
 
In sum, it does not seem evident that the economic conditions exist to support 
dissuasion.  Even if one was to consider that China must spread its wealth across four 
times as many people and that the PRC military-industrial complex is riddled with 
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problems, there just is not enough of a gap that the U.S. can spend unlimited amounts of 
money to counter any OCS procurements made by China.  This situation is especially 
difficult given the number and scope of global commitments supported with U.S. defense 
dollars.   
D. DIPLOMATIC CONDITIONS 
1. Criterion #1 – OCS Systems Violate International Laws and Norms 
Putting China in a position where the employment of the OCS capabilities they 
are currently developing is in violation of international law is one aspect of the 
diplomatic condition necessary for dissuasion success.  Strong and enforceable 
international laws or at minimum norms prohibiting the development of weaponized 
space platforms makes a formidable road block to their development.  Currently, the 
1967 Outer Space Treaty encourages the use of space for “peaceful purposes,” and 
prohibits the placement of nuclear weapons or WMD in space.108  However, this treaty 
was designed and intended to serve the Cold War and it is clearly targeting a specific sub-
set of space weaponry.  In fact, this treaty does leave the door open for space-based 
weapons as long as they do not contain nuclear or WMD material.  Of course, the term 
WMD can be interpreted loosely, but few would consider a space-based laser or space 
mine to fit into this category.  Consequently, some states have attempted to expand the 
laws of outer space and make more specific constraints on the placement of weapons in 
space.  The Chinese and Russian delegations to the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer 
Space (PAROS) strongly supported the notion of forbidding weapons in space.109 
However, this condition losses strength if the U.S. does not adhere to the same set 
of laws.  If the U.S. does indeed weaponize space with lasers or kinetic ASAT systems, 
whether as primary OCS systems or indirectly as part of a more elaborate ABM system, 
then it becomes extremely problematic for the diplomatic condition to support dissuasion.  
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Once the race for space-based weapons begins, then any attempt at dissuading OCS 
systems from space is over.  Space hawks like Everett Dolman actively argue that this is 
the best time for the Pentagon to field an armada of space-based weaponry.  Since no 
other state can match U.S. space superiority than why wait until they can to field these 
types of weapon systems.  Furthermore, Dolman believes that Beijing’s space capability 
is much closer to U.S. standards, more like ten to fifteen years behind, than one might be 
led to believe considering that the PRC uses first generation imaging systems, technology 
used by the U.S. during the 1960s.110  There is nothing wrong with this position as long 
as it aligns with the rest of the U.S. defense strategies.111  Unfortunately, if the U.S. 
wishes to dissuade China from entering into a space arms race, then this aggressive 
Astropolitik position just does not mesh with the broader security concerns. 
Another problem with this criterion is that certain space weapons such as links 
jammers are not viewed as illegal within the confines of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty or 
even within some viewpoints of PAROS and therefore provide China a viable option to 
sidestep this criterion.  In addition, with the introduction by the U.S. Air Force of the 
Counter Communications System (CCS), the space arms race has already taken a 
significant step that will be difficult to dissuade other states from taking.  As mentioned, 
several other states already posses these types of OCS systems, and at least one of which 
is a U.N. Security Council member, thus the likelihood of links jammers becoming 
subject to a U.N. treaty is low.  Moreover, with U.S. territory vulnerable to attack, 
terrestrial nodes long deemed secure just by their location within the U.S. are more 
susceptible to attack.   
2. Criterion #2 – OCS Systems Unnecessary Due to Strong Sino-
American Ties 
Diplomatically, the U.S. must build ties with China to convince them that space 
weapons are unnecessary in tomorrow’s world because the U.S. - China connection is so 
strong that future conflict is unrealistic or at least that the strategic gains of future conflict 
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are less than the costs.  Of any of the conditions and their criterion, this one is the easiest 
to accomplish because many of its foundational elements already exist: the United States 
and China are important trading partners; they actively cooperate on a range of 
international issues, and so on.  However, there are actions that may mitigate this 
criterion’s chance of success. 
First, with the European Union (EU) removing its military arms embargo that was 
enacted after the Tiananmen Square crackdown in 1989 while the U.S. keeps its in force 
China may have less need to maintain as strong of a relationship with the U.S as 
previously undertaken.  Second, strong ties do not guarantee peace.  Prior to WWI, 
Germany and Britain both prospered as each other’s largest trading partner.  Therefore, 
while strong diplomatic and economic relationships may guide state strategy, it is the 
security of state interests that predominantly drive state actions.  One approach that could 
reinforce this criterion from eroding is stronger ties between U.S. and Chinese space 
industries.   
Denny Roy of the Asia-Pacific Center believes that the Chinese position with 
respect to nuclear weapons is analogous to their position on space weapons, that if the 
U.S. reduces or eliminates its stockpile or ambitions in those respective areas then the 
PRC will reciprocate.112  The fact that China and Russia both have tried to push a 
weapons free space agenda in the UN supports this belief.  The implication of this is that 
an opportunity exists to strengthen this criterion if U.S. leadership chooses to support 
more aggressive anti space weapons treaties and policies.  Unfortunately, it seems likely 
that President Bush will advocate a space policy that strongly hedges against the need to 
develop and operationalize space-based weaponry in order to protect U.S. dependency.113  
Therefore, it is very unlikely that any country will react to this policy by giving up its 
own space weapon developments and instead states are more likely to continue pursuing 
such devices. 
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3. Criterion #3 – OCS Systems Would Target China’s Own Space 
Information 
Diplomacy can create a space dependency between the two states such that 
China’s space weapons development would only end up damaging systems they use 
themselves.  By providing military type information to China, the U.S. becomes an ally 
and not a foe.  Stronger ties between Washington and Beijing and the exertion of 
influence through the UN and other international organizations can create a diplomatic 
condition that does not allow China to develop OCS systems.   
One in-road to satisfying this criterion is the development of Chinese space 
systems by U.S. manufacturers.  Indeed, several PRC space systems have been built by 
American firms, such as AsiaSat-1, -3, and -3SA, which were built by Hughes and 
AsiaSat-2 which was built by Lockheed Martin.114  In fact, many experts, such as 
Elizabeth Van Wie Davis of the Asia-Pacific Center believe that Beijing is much more 
likely to procure rather than produce its space program.115  Another noted space expert, 
James Oberg, recently testified to congress with assessment of China’s space program.  
One highlight of the testimony was his comparison of the PRC and USSR space 
programs.  Using two nearly identical images, one of Yuri Gagarin’s space flight in 1961 
and one of Lang Liwei’s in 2003, Oberg effectively underscored the fact that China is 
using old Soviet systems to build up its own space program.116  Besides the obvious 
implication that China lacks the ability to produce many of its own systems, another 
implication is that China is ripe for space collaboration and it may be in Washington’s 
best interest to spearhead these efforts rather than the European Union.  
In sum, combining the facts that international laws and norms exist discouraging 
the weaponization of space, the strong interdependence between the U.S. and China, and 
that potentially Chinese and  American forces may well be using the same space systems 
(e.g., IntelSat) simultaneously makes for an overall favorable diplomatic condition.  
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However, much more in this area needs to be done to sustain this momentum.  China 
actively engages with the EU and ESA to advance its space capabilities.  Furthermore, 
the U.S. seems reluctant to sign on to proposed treaties that call for more strict weapons 
free space criteria. 
E. SUMMARY 
This chapter presented three conditions that must be present for dissuasion to 
succeed.  Militarily, a dissuasion policy must target emerging OCS systems not currently 
providing services to the PRC or integrated into existing PLA doctrine.  In addition, U.S. 
space systems must become unassailable to eliminate the enticement afforded by OCS 
capabilities.  In essence, why would China pursue counter space technologies if the U.S. 
system were impervious to such devices?  While portions of this condition are 
executable, the last criterion (i.e., unassailability) is far from becoming a reality. 
Economically, dissuasion has a better chance to succeed when the U.S. economy 
is vastly superior to the PRC.  However, while this superiority at first appears impressive, 
it will soon give way to the burgeoning Chinese economy, which is rising dramatically.  
In addition, the PLA does not need to spread its resources as thinly as the U.S. since its 
interests are constrained to its own territory, to include Taiwan.  Diplomatically, the 
possibility exists that this condition can be more easily fulfilled compared to other 
conditions.  International treaties and norms exist that support a weapons-free space 
environment.  Furthermore, Sino-American ties are reaching new heights, and although 
more could be done, both countries rely heavily on each other.  Moreover, as space assets 
become increasingly international and commercialized, they become less and less 
desirable for military targeting. 
Assessing the environment is an important step for any U.S. defense policy.  Just 
as one dips a toe or finger into the pool before taking the plunge, so to should U.S. 
strategists dip a “toe” into the military, economic, and diplomatic “pools” before 
embarking on a strategy of dissuasion.  However, in the case of dissuading China’s OCS 
procurement, the conditions are not present to support a strategy of dissuasion.  This 
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V. CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Analyzing defense policies is important because it affords refinement of current 
strategies and it helps leaders design objectives that are more effective in the future.  
Unfortunately, the very nature of international relations makes collective agreement on 
policy attributes rare.  A successful piece of one policy may in fact mean that another 
piece of that same policy failed.  Even within the same state, theorists spend countless 
pages in debate over classifying a policy as success or failure.  Furthermore, a policy can 
produce multiple outcomes as the Cold War exemplifies.  Touted as a success, the global 
stability caused by the deterrence policies of the twentieth century cost the U.S. and 
others irrelevant weapon systems, counterproductive budgets, and regional instability.  
Yet, the process of analyzing these policies provides valuable information to proponents 
and opponents alike.  In addition, understanding the outcomes of past policies help to 
frame the conditions for successful policy in the future. 
For example, President Wilson’s decision to enter WWI in the spring of 1917 was 
necessary to prevent a victory by the Germans.  In addition, this policy was effective in 
contributing to a substantial rise in U.S. power.  Granted, the costs of this policy in terms 
of lives and taxpayer money were enormous, but earning a place at the peace table was a 
key step in increasing the global position of the U.S.  Conversely, many theorists and 
world leaders point to the U.S. policy of pre-emption in Iraq as counterproductive 
because even though it was believed necessary to stabilize the region and reduce the 
threat of WMD and terrorism, this policy has had the opposite effect.  Opponents point to 
the substantial increase in insurgency and terrorism that has sprung up in Iraq since the 
end of official hostilities in May 2003.   
Nonetheless, discussing these policies and their impact is important to future 
strategists.  The lessons learned from the failed appeasement policies prior to WWII were 
directly responsible for the deterrence policies of the Cold War.  Fearing a similar crisis 
as the one sparked by Nazi Germany, the international community embraced deterrence 
because it meant that the rising power of the Soviets would be equaled by that of the 
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Americans.  Consequently, Stalin could not simply roll over Europe as Hitler had done in 
1941.  However, as experts began to analyze the nuclear arms race, many people realized 
that deterrence carried its own bag of counterproductive and failed policy results.  Today, 
policy makers in Washington are counting on dissuasion to avoid some of the pitfalls of 
deterrence as well as bolster other defense policies by preventing specific arms races.  
China’s space weapon programs offer one such target for dissuasion. 
Unfortunately, assessing the utility of a dissuasive space policy is challenging.  A 
host of problems contributes to this challenge.  First, China already has operational space 
systems providing them with numerous services.  Second, it is difficult at times to 
distinguish between military and commercial space systems.  Third, even if a state does 
not actively launch its own space systems, other states or commercial systems can 
provide the desired space-based information.  Due to these challenges, it is imperative 
that any dissuasion strategy aimed at China’s space program target offensive counter 
space (OCS) systems such as space-based ASAT platforms and ground-based jammers. 
The military only system criterion represents one portion of the overall military, 
economic, and diplomatic conditions necessary for the successful dissuasion of China’s 
space weapons.  Other conditions and their respective criteria, summarized in Table 7, are 
necessary.  Conditions include the unassailability of U.S. systems, the overwhelming 
U.S. economy, and the strong interdependence of U.S. – PRC relations.  Unfortunately, it 
is neither possible nor highly likely that many of the conditions necessary for successful 
dissuasion exist now or will in the future.  For example, it is nearly impossible for the 
Pentagon to make its systems unassailable, whether it is through advanced defensive 
mechanisms, replenishment, or alternative source capabilities.  The economic condition 
looks similarly unattainable since the China – U.S. economic gap is rapidly closing.  In 
the future, China may surpass the U.S. as the biggest economy in the world and would 
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dissuasion will succeed. 
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Organizing these conditions into Table 7 aids in the discussion of dissuasion, but 
it should not be seen as a linear equation.  These conditions represent the logical analysis 
of U.S. defense strategies in today’s environment.  However, they do not account for or 
replace judgment and risk.  U.S. leaders must weigh these conditions against other issues 
and judge if the risk of attempting dissuasion is worth the consequences.  The reason 
these policies make up larger defense strategies is exactly because nothing is certain, and 
a proper blend of strategies is usually the best choice as well as insurance against one 
specific policy’s failure.  If U.S. assurances to Taiwan fail to prevent them from openly 
declaring independence, then hopefully America’s deterrence policies will still keep 
China from attacking across the straits.  All a policy maker can do is analyze the best 
information available and then make an educated decision about how to proceed.  In 
essence, this is the art or skill required for most decision-making processes. 
Examining the utility of dissuasion is a worthwhile exercise.  The U.S. and others 
have invested heavily in traditional defense policies.  While the placement of U.S. service 
members, conventional forces, and nuclear weapons in Europe assured NATO that Soviet 
forces would remain behind the Iron Curtain, it nonetheless came at a substantial cost.  
The policy of deterrence proved worthwhile during the Cold War; although, like 
assurance, it extracted a cost from the U.S. and the rest of the world.  The tradeoffs for 
nuclear stability were regional instability and the diversion of the global economy away 
from other areas such as education and health care.  In addition, the policy of defeat, 
played out in the numerous wars of the past century, was clearly needed in situations like 
WWII, but again the costs were high.   
In today’s security environment, American leaders must make countless decisions 
with respect to the interests of the state.  One of these decisions is determining the 
tradeoff between dissuading other states from pursuing certain weapon systems and the 
potential consequences of what these countries do in response to this policy.  The 
response to U.S. superiority on the seas is mini-subs and the response to U.S. superiority 
in the air is surface-to-air missiles (SAM).  Figure 1 in Chapter I expanded this type of 
cause-effect relationship on a much broader scale by depicting how the unmanageable 
nuclear stand-off and overwhelming might of Washington’s conventional forces have 
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caused other states and non-state actors to pursue weapon systems and tactics that avoid 
these strengths entirely.  Unfortunately, whether this was the intended “channel” 
envisioned by the drafters of the 2001 QDR or not, the dissuasive consequences of the 
overwhelming U.S. military power have been largely detrimental since the Pentagon is ill 
prepared to handle the irregular or disruptive challenges that flow from this type of 
policy.  The notion of “channeling” threats is admirable, but if the channeler is not 
prepared to catch the channeled, then the concept does not work (e.g., insurgency in Iraq 
or Cubans jamming U.S. satellite broadcasts).   
If dissuasion is pursued with respect to illegal space weapons, it may simply cause 
U.S. adversaries to produce more and better types of links based OCS systems that fall 
outside of international law.  Even though some space weapons have proved ineffective, 
like the GPS jammer used against coalition forces in Iraqi Freedom, others, like Cuba’s 
satellite jammers that targeted the Voice of America broadcast, have been remarkably 
capable at affecting U.S. space systems.  Furthermore, these types of disruptive 
technologies provide a glimpse as to how future adversaries will attempt to deny the U.S. 
access to space.118  It seems that a combination of other policy tools may present the 
most viable option to preventing a space arms race.  By leveraging existing space law, 
advocating space arms control, increasing economic interdependence and using skillful 
diplomacy, the U.S. may prevent a space race as well as avoid the counterproductive 
results likely to arise from a dissuasive strategy.  Table 7 reveals that dissuasions success 
is in fact most likely to occur when a combination of several policy tools are employed 
simultaneously.  However, the 2002 NSS and 2001 QDR do not describe dissuasion in 
this manner.  Instead, both documents focus on increasing military superiority to such a 
high level that the enemy or allies give up weapons development.  Unfortunately, the 
conditions are not present for this policy as currently defined to succeed. 
Nevertheless, the concept of dissuasion offers the possibility that other more 
costly defense policy goals may not be required as often in the future or that they may 
become stronger when considered as a packaged strategic plan.  The strategy of 
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dissuading other states from entering into an arms race has the potential benefit of 
reducing the need to deter or defeat an adversary in the future, and anything that saves 
money and lives is worth investigating.  The need for this type of policy is compelling, 
but its use to prevent a space arms race is likely to fail and inevitably create a whole 
range of offensive counter space (OCS) systems that seek to disrupt the enormous 
advantage of space operations enjoyed by America.  Consequently, any potential conflict 
with China would see U.S. ships forced to elude subs, U.S. air forces dodging SAMs, and 
U.S. space systems interrupted by jammers targeting their links. 
B. POLICY ASSESSMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Still, opportunities exist to reduce the threat to U.S. space systems.  This thesis 
has highlighted several areas where dissuasion seems promising and after reviewing the 
necessary conditions (reference Table 7), the U.S. can take steps to slow the development 
of Chinese counter space systems, increase the protection of American space systems, 
and “manage the rise of China.”   
1. Strategy 
As a strategy, dissuasion may not provide the same level of clarity in application 
as other defense policies.  In addition, it is highly unlikely that American technological 
superiority can be harnessed in such a manner that potential adversaries give up pursuing 
their own security interests.  No state has done this.  Nonetheless, this is exactly what is 
proposed in the 2005 NDS.  The U.S. fighter aircraft fleet is far superior to any other air 
force in the world.  However, this does not stop other states from developing fighters, nor 
does it prevent them from developing systems to counter this superiority.  The SAMs 
proliferating the globe demonstrates the inevitable pushback approaches undertaken by 
states confronted with an adversary who possesses superior air power.  Similarly, the 
U.S. Navy enjoys dominance on the seas, but this does not dissuade other states from 
pursuing naval build up.  In fact, it increases the likelihood that others will follow suit.  
Look no further than the build up of the PLA Navy (PLAN).  Beijing is pursuing a blue 
water force capable of protecting and maybe even projecting Chinese influence certainly 
within the Asia-Pacific and possible beyond. 
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The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) put forth by President Reagan in 1983 is 
poor evidence that a policy of dissuasion can work.  It is debatable at best that SDI 
caused the USSR to do anything, let alone to concede the arms race or bow out of the 
Cold War.  First, SDI in 1983 was far from being technologically feasible.  In fact, even 
given current technology, ground-based ABM systems have proven less than reliable.  
Moreover, as ABM technologies proceed upwards, costs and challenges soar.  The 
Airborne Laser (ABL) under development at Edwards Air Force Base (AFB) California 
is considerably further behind in research and development than the ground-based 
concepts frequently tested over the Pacific Ocean.119  To go one step further and try to 
mount an ABM system aboard a satellite would require vast sums of money and 
technological breakthroughs.  Therefore, any belief that SDI caused the USSR to pause 
and reconsider its interests is doubtful.  Second, even if SDI could have been developed 
and tested to some degree of reliability, it is also argumentative that it necessarily caused 
the Soviets to “give up.”120 
China and space weaponry are no different today than the USSR and SDI 
relationship was in 1983.  China will pursue whatever is in its best interests, and it will 
not back down or give up simply because the U.S. fields its own arsenal of space 
weapons.  Therefore, as a strategy, dissuasion’s success is more about diplomatic and 
economic partnerships and less about military superiority. 
2. China’s Rise 
Specific to the rise of China, dissuasion has already proved of little utility.  The 
U.S. has attempted to dissuade China from solving the Taiwan issue militarily.  However, 
the Chinese continue to pursue a military capable of overrunning Taiwan, amphibious 
assault forces, a blue water navy, advanced SAM, and counter space weaponry.  Beijing 
also continues to make strong and even provocative statements about Taiwanese 
independence.  In light of these actions, it appears that dissuasion is failing. 
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The opportunities for dissuasion to succeed with respect to China are similar to 
those stated in the previous section.  Efforts by Washington to dissuade PLA actions and 
instead channel its efforts in directions more favorable to America are not realistic.  This 
is especially true given China’s growing economy, military modernization, and 
increasing partnerships with other states.  However, U.S. strategists are compelled to do 
something to protect American influence abroad.  Britain faced a similar dilemma when it 
began to fall from its position as global hegemon during the first half of the twentieth 
century.  Unfortunately, Washington is slowly realizing, much like Britain’s leadership, 
that only so much can be done to protect these high levels of power.   
Britain’s fall from power was a direct result of the changing international system.  
The demise of mercantilism, the slow erosion of colonialism, and the industrial 
revolution combined to create an environment where British naval mastery simply could 
no longer control the international order in the same manner as it enjoyed previously.  
Today, American dominance of the international system sits upon a precipice and many 
theorists argue over if or when China will assume the position of global hegemon.  Others 
debate whether U.S. policies can do anything about the changing dynamics of the world 
order.   
The designers of dissuasion are attempting to delay or possibly even secure 
indefinitely America’s position on top of the world.  However, dissuasion will not slow 
down China’s economic growth, derail its global influence, or channel its security 
interests somewhere considered more favorable to the U.S.  Therefore, it is in 
Washington’s best interest to promote institutions (e.g., United Nations, World Trade 
Organization, etc.) that will sustain significant levels of influence even if the PRC should 
become a greater power.  
3. Chinese Space Weapons 
The U.S. has the most to lose in a conflict that physically destroys space-based 
platforms.  The forthcoming release of President Bush’s space policy will shed a little 
light on this subject, but some speculate that this policy, like his predecessor’s, will leave 
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the door open for space-based weapons.121  By itself, this is not cause for alarm, but in 
conjunction with the pre-emptive nature that the administration approaches international 
relations, it is less than certain that the U.S. will leave space free of destructive devices.  
American forces clearly have the most to lose should space systems be subject to 
destruction or negation.  Moreover, the cost relative to strategic value gained by 
weaponizing space to insure these systems is significantly more than can be justified.  
Furthermore, the technology required to field space weapons is theoretical at best.  
Granted, the fact that U.S. forces do rely on space so much is a compelling argument to 
field OCS systems in an effort to protect this reliance.  In addition, if it were affordable 
and doable, then weaponizing space would be a plausible option.   
Despite U.S. economic and technological advantages, an unrestrained 
space race would impose significant costs and produce few lasting 
strategic advantages unless the U.S. can dominate both offensively, by 
destroying an adversary’s space assets, and defensively, by protecting U.S. 
space assets.122 
However, this is not the case, and when combined with the self-induced strains 
placed on U.S. persona within the international community, it seems that any diplomatic 
weight that the U.S. may have at one time possessed has been eroding over the last few 
years.  In essence, if Washington would stop breaking the China in the China Shop, then 
it may have an opportunity to cash in on its diplomatic influence and convince others that 
its space policy is in everyone’s best interests. 
From a strategic perspective, collaboration may reduce the chance of a future 
conflict, although this has not always been the case.  Nonetheless, open communication, 
shared interests, and a better understanding of each other can go a long way toward 
reducing tensions.  Furthermore, from the tactical perspective, joint space ventures would 
complicate any attempts by the PLA to target U.S.-only space systems.  Granted, it would 
be impossible to make everything joint, but SATCOM, navigation, and weather systems 
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make a good springboard for such an undertaking and would limit the number of targets 
available to the PLA should they consider embarking on firing a space weapon.   
The European Union, Brazil, and others are already working with Beijing on 
developing new space systems.  Washington has allowed some limited U.S. involvement 
in China’s space program, but may need to reconsider its position and make the Chinese 
market even more accessible.  Therefore, Washington should avoid a space policy that 
encourages weapons in space and discourages Sino-American space collaboration as a 
means to dissuade Chinese space programs and protect American systems.   
C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
As a master of warfare, Sun Tzu sought to describe the difficulties of conflict in a 
simplistic manner.  The outcome was his writings The Art of War, a list of principles or 
rules by which to guide the application of force.  The rationale follows that by 
simplifying the complexities of war; warriors can more easily recall and apply time-tested 
truths in the heat of battle.  The challenge though of embarking on this process is that 
when one whittles down these complexities into a few short statements, it is possible to 
lose important characteristics that do not readily or easily simplify.  Furthermore, even if 
one has uncovered the optimal list of guiding truths, he must be able to translate, merge, 
and employ these truths in a coherent manner.  This then represents the art of The Art of 
War, the ability to meld the appropriate principles of war into an effective strategy.   
One of Sun Tzu’s beliefs was that avoiding battle should be considered of great 
importance. 
Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy’s army without battle.  They 
capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without 
protracted operations.123  
This is consistent with many of his other beliefs, such as taking the state “intact,” 
“captur[ing] the enemy is better than destroy[ing] it,” and to “subdue the enemy without 
fighting is the acme of skill.”124  Furthermore, these beliefs highlight a common theme 
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that prescribes the use of a strong military to force enemy capitulation.  That the 
possession of equally matched adversaries only serves to invoke combat.   
This belief is similar to the policy of dissuasion espoused by U.S. strategists in 
recent high-level documents and discussed within this thesis.  It is apparent in the 
statements and policies of the current U.S. administration that it should and will utilize its 
relative strength to sustain its own security.  In the words of Brad Roberts 
Dissuasion must work for the best, even as it helps to hedge against the 
worst in future major power relations.125 
Andrew Scobell describes China’s strategic thought as being dual natured.  On 
one hand, it is “conflict averse” and undertakes defensive-minded approaches to 
international relations.  On the other hand, PRC leaders seem to enjoy using the PLA to 
deal with conflicts or disturbances in the system.126  Another PRC expert, David Lai, 
uses the Chinese game of ‘Go’ to describe the nuances of Beijing’s stratagems.  Instead 
of approaching China with an American football approach that emphasizes force on force 
or chess mindset, which encourages power plays, it would be wise to consider the manner 
by which Chinese tend to construct strategy.  The game of ‘Go’ emphasizes winning 
strategies that rarely achieve annihilation of the enemy but rather see tactics that lead to 
relatively small differences between the winner and loser.127   
Lai recognizes the troublesome nature of trying to label China with some sort of 
exacting degree of confidence.  Nonetheless, his estimate is that Beijing is seeking to re-
establish China’s role as a great power.  In addition, PRC leaders are adamant that 
Taiwan reunify.128  Scobell and his own assessment on Chinese strategy is simply the 
means by which China’s leaders will attempt to accomplish these objectives.  However, it 
seems likely that these objectives will inevitably conflict with those of the U.S.  
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Regardless, based on recent statements from Washington, America will continue to use 
more force-on-force type strategies to achieve its own objectives. 
America has, and intends to keep, military strengths beyond challenge 
thereby, making the destabilizing arms races of other eras pointless, and 
limiting rivalries to trade and other pursuits of peace.129 
However, no matter the depth of analysis one thing is clear with respect to 
dissuasion.  It is going to be difficult policy to implement and even more difficult to 
classify as a success or failure.  While this thesis attempted to clarify the meaning of 
dissuasion, it also reaffirmed the notion that this concept is difficult to grasp.  This is due 
in no small part to the lack of literature on the subject to include sparse guidance from its 
designers.  Another factor contributing to its elusiveness is that it tries to straddle the 
fence in the same manner as the détente policies instituted by President Nixon during the 
early 1970s.  
Détente as a state of existence that combined both conflict and cooperation 
was more difficult to understand than the Cold War.  It was easier to 
explain a relationship that was essentially one of confrontation or 
cooperation.130 
As discussed in Chapter II and depicted in Figure 2, dissuasion addresses issues in 
the middle of the spectrum where the classification of friend or foe becomes difficult to 
ascertain.  In fact, in retrospect it may be more appropriate to illustrate a defense policy 
spectrum where deterrence and defeat occupy one end of the spectrum and assurance the 
other, while dissuasion wanders in the middle, much like Nixon and Kissinger’s version 
of détente. 
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Figure 14.   Modified Defense Policy Spectrum 
 
In sum, this thesis prescribed a simplified set of conditions necessary to attain 
dissuasion, although it does not imply that they are sufficient for this policy to succeed.  
Instead, dissuasion, which is really the ability to avoid war, must also account for the 
nuances of defense policies.  Therefore, the art of dissuasion and its viability as a strategy 
to stem the tide of space weapons procurement is tough to discern.  Indeed, U.S. policy 
makers will likely hedge one way or the other, either towards a more deterrence-oriented 
policy through the advocating of U.S. space weapons and the protection these systems 
may provide or through an assurance focused strategy that fosters international norms 































APPENDIX. HISTORICAL PROGRESSION OF SPACE 
CAPABILITIES131 
Understanding the means by which America earned its dominating position in 
space will help illustrate why this may be seen as a tantalizing target for would be 
adversaries. The manner by which space systems evolved directly influenced the lack of 
space-based weaponry and resulted in the only domain of military operations where 
critical U.S. security interests remain physically defenseless. Furthermore, the 
intertwined nature of space systems and nuclear arms has significantly affected U.S. 
defense policies since the first successful launch of a CORONA satellite on August 10 
1960. 
A. EARLY THEORIES OF ROCKETRY 
Explorers have always sought to discover new and uncharted areas and space 
simply afforded one more domain which man could conquer.  However, disinterested 
governments and the lack of convenient and widespread global communications left the 
early space researches in relative obscurity as well as isolation from one another.  A 
German named Herman Ganswindt was one of the first scientists to publish space related 
research when in 1891 he produced a theoretically sound design for a spaceship.  Sadly, 
he spent most of his life producing disappointing airships and espousing scientific 
theories deemed unacceptable by his more pragmatic contemporaries.132  In 1883, a 
Russian named Konstantin Tsiolkovsky described in detail and with sound mathematical 
support the notion that rockets could place satellites into earth orbit.  To arouse popular 
interest, between 1893 and 1896, he penned two short stories titled An Imaginary Journey 
to the Moon and Is there Life on Other Worlds?.  The 1903 publishing of his first 
complete manuscript, The Exploration of Cosmic Space by Rocket, highlighted 
Tsiolkovsky’s work.133  A few years later an American, Robert Goddard would also 
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study rocketry and by 1912 proved that liquid propelled rockets could actually work in a 
vacuum like space.  In 1919, Goddard’s published work titled A Method of Attaining 
Extreme Altitude laid the foundation for American rocket developments and by 1929 he 
had demonstrated the practicality of placing sensors on-board rockets to collect weather 
measurements.  Interestingly, neither of these early space advocates received much 
attention for their work.  In fact, Tsiolkovsky was thought to be eccentric by his fellow 
scientists and conducted his research without any funding.  Similarly, Goddard worked in 
relative obscurity, although he did receive some limited funding through Charles 
Lindberg and the Guggenheim Foundation.  Soon though, space technology was about to 
get a substantial boost in interest from the highest levels of government. 
B. “VERGELTUNG” (VENGEANCE!) 
In 1932, Adolph Hitler directed his German scientists, most notably Wernher von 
Braun, to change course on their research and focus on rockets as weapons and not 
simply futuristic exploration vehicles.  As a result, the Vergeltung weapon V-2 would be 
unleashed against England on September 8, 1944.134  This change would profoundly 
affect the course of space system development and immediately gave rocketry a much 
more military focus and with it, a sense of urgency absent from previous space 
endeavors.  Furthermore, it gave these initial space zealots the necessary attention and 
financing to pursue space interests thoroughly.  Of course, any focus  outside of Hitler’s 
was cause for arrest and even though von Braun “daren’t tell Hitler” about his secret 
plans to convert the V-2 into a manned vehicle with a pressurized capsule instead of a 
warhead, the Gestapo found out and promptly arrested him and others in his group.135  
Nonetheless, fueled partly by Hitler’s militaristic ambitions as well as von Braun’s own 
dreams about space, the V-2 program was instrumental in translating the theories and 
ideas of Ganswindt, Tsiolkovsky, and Goddard into reality. 
Upon overtaking Peenemunde in April 1945, Allied forces quickly seized the V-2 
program to include its scientists whom had relocated to Bavaria and shipped them back to 
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America under the program Project Paperclip.136  In addition, even though the Soviets 
were left with little hardware to bring back to Moscow, they were able to round up 
numerous Peenemunde scientists scattered throughout Eastern Europe.  The breakup of 
the German V-2 program at the end of WWII directly contributed to the impending 
nuclear arms race as both future superpowers eagerly gobbled up the available knowledge 
and immediately set about improving existing rocket technology.  For the American and 
Soviet scientists involved it was a stark contrast to pre-WWII days when their profession 
was regulated to small local advocacy clubs that used member’s garages and basements 
to conduct experiments.  Instead, this new era afforded them the tools and resources to 
more thoroughly test and produce rockets.   
C. BALLISTIC MISSILES AND THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE 
After the Soviets successfully tested an atomic weapon on August 29, 1949, the 
nuclear arms race was in full swing.  Moreover, the June 1950 North Korean invasion of 
South Korea, in part supported by the USSR, caused the tensions between Moscow and 
Washington to reach new levels.  Ultimately, President Truman signed National Security 
Council (NSC) document #68 to articulate the current state of affairs. 
On the one hand, the people of the world yearn for relief from the anxiety 
arising from the risk of atomic war.  On the other hand, any substantial 
further extension of the area under domination of the Kremlin would raise 
the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin with 
greater strength could be assembled.137 
Pushed by military and political leaders of both superpowers and using 
knowledge gained from the V-2 program, post-WWII scientists sought to extend the 
range of ballistic missiles in an effort to improve each belligerent’s nuclear capabilities.  
Initially, the Kremlin took greater interest in ballistic missile development than the 
Pentagon.  One reason that the Americans chose not to aggressively pursue ballistic 
missile development was that President Truman’s lead scientific advisor in the 1940s, 
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Vannevar Bush failed to “see any great future” in them.138  In addition, early nuclear 
weapons were simply too big to be delivered by a missile.  This delighted early air power 
advocates and combined with the recent Strategic Bombing Surveys solidified the U.S. 
air centric position with respect to nuclear weapons delivery.139  Conversely, for the 
USSR the ballistic missile was a logical choice because of geographic factors.  In 
addition, The Soviets initially saw rockets as an improved form of artillery, their 
dominant weapon in their war against Germany.  The Americans initially saw rockets as 
an inferior form of airplane, the dominant weapon in their war against Germany.  
Interestingly though, the Soviets first capability to reach the U.S. through intercontinental 
delivered nukes was the Bison and Bear bombers, which became operational in 1956.  
Still, the Soviets pressed on under the belief that rockets would comprise the foundation 
of their nuclear forces.  Russian nuclear arms expert Pavel Podvig confirms this position. 
Since the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, could not deploy its 
bombers close to the adversary’s borders, delivering nuclear weapons to 
US territory required the development of intercontinental platforms.140 
The intense efforts by the Soviets to develop an equalizer to the U.S. bomber 
force drove the Soviets to develop the ICBM along with a whole family of short and 
medium range ballistic missiles.  Soviet ballistic missiles development surged to such a 
level that in December 1959 the USSR created an entirely separate service, the Strategic 
Rocket Forces, to manage these devices.  Two of the initial Soviet ballistic missiles, the 
SS-4 Sandal and SS-6 Silkwood achieved operational status in 1959 and 1957 
respectively.141  While each satisfied ballistic missile requirements; it was their inclusion 
in other activities that prominently affected future space efforts.  In 1962, the Sandal’s 
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placement in Cuba brought the world to the brink of a global nuclear exchange between 
the U.S. and Soviets, although the medium range SS-4 missiles were eventually removed 
from the island as the Soviets realized it did not possess enough nuclear weapons 
compared to the U.S. to win this atomic standoff.142  Nonetheless, the Sandal 
demonstrated advanced capabilities with a range of over 1,000 miles and the strength to 
carry a one-megaton nuclear warhead.   
On the one hand, the outcome of the Cuban Missile Crisis was positive.  The 
belligerents avoided nuclear and conventional war and adversary medium range nuclear 
missiles were removed from proximity of both states.  On the other hand, this crisis 
further entrenched the belief by both sides that nuclear weapons equaled immense 
bargaining power.  The Soviet leadership immediately embarked on an aggressive 
program to field a numerically superior nuclear force, primarily consisting of ICBM, in 
an effort to avoid bargaining from a position of nuclear weakness again.   
Another Soviet ballistic missile during this period, the SS-6 Sapwood, 
demonstrated similar capabilities as the SS-4, but intrigued Soviet scientists more for its 
potential to carry objects into earth orbit than to carry weapons across the earth’s 
oceans.143  Ultimately, the Sapwood would become famous on October 4, 1957 when a 
modified version successfully launched Sputnik-I into orbit.  This simultaneous 
development of space and ballistic missile capabilities dates back to at least as early as 
1931 when Hitler sidetracked von Braun from space scientist to ballistic missile expert.  
Inevitably, the SS-6 proved that ballistic missiles possessed the capacity to carry objects 
into the earths orbit.  Consequently, these rockets provided a means to launch satellites 
with the capability to monitor American ICBM fields that the Sapwood was also 
designed to destroy.  Therefore, the rapid development of the Sapwood marked a key 
point in the fielding of on-orbit space systems since it overcame the initial as well as most 
significant hurdle to space flight (i.e., space lift). 
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D. A NEED FOR SPY SATELLITES 
The rapid development and fielding of the Soviet ICBM in light of the Cuban 
missile crisis caused many reactions in the U.S.   
The military’s response was to call for more bombers, more nuclear 
weapons, and the capability to survive a Soviet first strike and to hit back 
with a massive retaliatory strike.  The Intelligence Community’s response 
was to develop better intelligence on the Soviet Union and to start learning 
what the Soviets were preparing to do before they actually did it.144 
Granted, the Soviet testing of a nuclear device in 1949 and the North Korean invasion 
into the South in 1950 caused Eisenhower to create the initial U-2 program to help better 
prepare leadership for these types of events.  However, the U-2 was starting to show its 
limitations and simply could not cover the entire expanse of the USSR in a reliable and 
persistent manner.  Moreover, Eisenhower was unable to convince Khrushchev to accept 
his 1955 Open Skies treatise allowing overhead reconnaissance via aircraft.145  In 
addition, the downing of U-2 pilot Gary Powers in May 1960 highlighted the 
vulnerability of airborne intelligence and reinforced the idea that space-based 
photoreconnaissance was needed.  Therefore, at the highest levels of Washington 
leadership, the foray into space clearly represented the pursuit of necessary and tangible 
security interests. 
Conversely, the Soviets efforts seemed more like attempts to earn broad-based 
domestic and political pride by achieving hallmark steps in the exploration of space.  
Certainly, Sputnik’s success in 1957 followed by Yuri Gagarin’s ride to the cosmos 
onboard the spaceship Vostok in April 1961 translated into a great esteem for the Soviets.  
They had achieved two significant “firsts” in space exploration with these missions, and 
although America by 1961 looked to be winning the long-term race, “in the realm of 
spectaculars-the Soviets still claimed the definitive lead.”146  Nonetheless, this race at 
first glance appeared to be more about “spectacular” milestones than tangible military 
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achievements.  In fact, immediately following the initial successes of Gagarin’s flight the 
Soviet General Consul confirmed this position by stating that they “are mainly interested 
in people’s excitement and reaction” to space achievements.147  In the U.S., the apparent 
Soviet lead in the space race caused mixed feelings. 
The reactions of official Washington amounted to little more than a 
prolonged yawn that the inevitable had occurred…Some of Washington, 
however, was disheartened by the news.  Although the President formally 
congratulated the USSR on their latest space endeavor, Congress was not 
in such a commendable mood.148 
This ultimately proved beneficial for both sides.  The belief that Washington was 
lagging in space capabilities provided an infusion of interest as well as money into both 
the less useful but spectacular manned space program and also into the less spectacular 
but highly useful space reconnaissance program.   
And so the CORONA program moved forward.  It proceeded with great 
haste.  In April 1958, with presidential approval, CORONA came to 
fruition.  In the span of a little over a decade, it produced 145 launches at a 
cost of $850 million and returned 300 million nautical miles of cloud-free 
photography revealing all of the Soviet missile complexes-medium, 
intermediate, and long-range; each class of their submarines; a complete 
inventory of their bombers and fighters; the Soviets’ ABM effort; and 
their weapons storage.  It also gave us maps for strategic targeting.  More 
important, it gave our policy makers the confidence to enter disarmament 
talks and fashion SALT I Treaty.  It was a remarkable program.149 
In the statement above, noted American space expert John McMahon captures the 
essence of the U.S. interest in space.  No doubt, space afforded the U.S. and others 
incredible advantages across a whole spectrum of uses.  Consequently, the greater the 
advantages became the more that each superpower began to take the first steps to 
weaponize the highest frontier to deny each other or at least possess the ability to deny 
each other access to space systems.  Beginning in the late 1960s each side began to 
explore the prospects of anti-satellite weapon systems. 
                                                 
147 Donald Cox, The Space Race: From Sputnik to Apollo…and Beyond.  p. 9 
148 Ibid, p. 6 
149 Quote by John N. McMahon taken from Dwayne A. Day, John M. Logsdon, and Brian Latell, Eye 
in the Sky: The Story of the CORONA Spy Satellites, p. 182 
 92
The Soviets first ASAT used an ICBM fitted with an explosive device that 
released 1,000s of small pellets once it approached its intended satellite target.  In 
addition, the Soviet nuclear-armed Galosh ABM interceptor could fulfill the role of 
ASAT weapon against satellites in specific low earth orbits (LEO).  The Americans also 
investigated a crude ASAT system in the late 1960s but eventually abandoned it in favor 
of an F-15 launched ASAT system that lingered in existence until the mid-1980s.150  
During this time, the development of ASAT systems may have seemed like simply the 
natural evolution of space utility.  Much like other mediums of operation, it was simply a 
matter of time before the necessity arose to destroy and therefore protect space-based 
systems.  Interestingly though, ASAT systems did not follow this path and never did 
produce a true military arms race in space.  In fact, to this day space has remained 
relatively free of weapons.  But, why?  Moreover, how did this influence the 
development of future space systems? 
One reason why ASAT development did not endear itself to superpower 
leadership was the potential destabilizing affect it would cause on the tenuous nuclear 
arms race.  ASAT systems that destroyed the adversary’s missile warning or 
communications systems may mean that the aggressor is considering a first-strike.  
ASAT systems that target remote sensing platforms may imply that one side is covertly 
trying to change its nuclear lay down, either by moving systems around or fueling up new 
systems.  In either case, it can easily be inferred that ASAT systems are a precursor to a 
first strike, which might cause a destabilizing influence on the already tricky Cold War.  
Therefore, the presence and affect of ASAT systems during the Cold War was short lived 
and of small impact.  In addition, the demise of the ASAT re-enforced the notion that 
space systems best served a critical but nonetheless supporting role to other means of 
warfare and security.  President Johnson highlighted the capability and value of these 
early space programs. 
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I wouldn’t want to be quoted on this but we’ve spent 35 or 40 billion 
dollars on the space program.  And if nothing else had come out of it 
except the knowledge we’ve gained from space photography, it would be 
worth 10 times what the whole program cost.  Because tonight we know 
how many missiles the enemy has and, it turned out, our guesses were way 
off.  We were doing things we didn’t need to do.  We were building things 
we didn’t need to build.  We were harboring fears we didn’t need to 
harbor.  Because of satellites, I know how many missiles the enemy 
has.151 
As the nuclear arms race progressed and the Cold War intensified a broader range 
of space programs emerged.  The deployment of U.S. strategic forces across the globe 
meant that the U.S. needed a secure and reliable means to communicate strategic 
directives rapidly, if necessary.  With some air bases in austere locations plus submarines 
constantly on the prowl, landlines simply could not fulfill this requirement.  Furthermore, 
the ability to communicate with strategic bombers in-flight required the fielding of 
satellite communications (SATCOM).  In addition, other space-based systems, such as 
missile warning, navigation, and weather sensors developed during the Cold War.  
However, it was not until after the Cold War that U.S. dependency on these systems 
manifested itself.     
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